Hello and welcome everybody. So this then is the second session where I'm taking you through the use of prenuptial agreements and raising conduct in financial remedy cases of a warm welcome to all of you. And uh this study is the session through data law and I'm S Mahmod. So as you know that in this session, I'm taking you through both nuptial agreements, prenups and post nup agreements. And we're also looking at the areas surrounding conduct to see how the two tied to Gaza. And uh so you've got the learning objectives there, which I went through with you last time and also the course summary, which again I went through with you last time. So I won't repeat that. And then the goal very much is to go through these areas to give you a good granite of these matters when you're advising in family law related issues. And I'm looking at the laws of August 2024. So last time you remember I spent a fair bit of time then going through with you the position surrounding the development option agreements, we looked at the case of mcleod, we then went through uh the leading case of radmacher. Since then, obviously, we looked at some of the other cases. There was a case of S A, there's a case of La la Mata, for example, XWXH, uh there's the icu mcconnell decision, for example, a HC case. And you can see there's a number of decisions over the years which have really looked at the development of these. And we, we talked last time about the benefit of the nuptial agreements. And clearly, they can be incredibly useful where you're maybe instructed by a client, where there is quite a disparity of wealth, be between them. And therefore one person perhaps uh may wish to uh ring fence the prema to wealth. But also remember I mentioned this is very useful uh for which welsh cases, for example, that whether they want certainty rather than relying upon the course uh wide discretion in terms of the uh the exercise of the application of section 25 in looking at what should be divided in those circumstances. Now, when you are drafting option agreements, it's very, very important to bear in mind that uh just like any area uh that you're going to be looking at drafting, there is certainty and clarity. So what I would suggest is when you're drafting, make sure that you are putting necessary recitals in there. So set out the basis upon which, which disagreement and what I would mean by suggest by that is set out essentially the factors which led to them uh pulling disagreement together in the first place. And what I mean by that is a what the factors which led to the agreement? When did they start negotiating? Was there liaison between lawyers? Was there discussions over what period of time and so forth? Put that make sure you put in the agreement, the fact that uh it's signed, not just by their respective parties, but also by their lawyers to confirm that legal advice was taken, even if you got one party whose self representing was a litigant in person, making sure that the uh prenuptial agreement, postnuptial agreement makes it clear that they were offered the opportunity of taking legal advice and they took the advice would have declined. But nonetheless, they were satisfied as to the contents of the agreement and they had full appreciation of it and understood what it meant. So very, very clear to make sure that those expectations are there put definitions in there just like when you're drafting a uh financial consent order and the standard orders we use. Typically nowadays, you've got a definition section, do the same with these, define what's met by the intended ma money harm, def define what is met by the various clauses and the terms in that regard, set out the terms, what's to happen there. So, in the event of divorce or dissolution of civil partnership, how are the is, are the assets to be divided? Is there going to be disparity of. Is there going to be departure from quality? And if so on what basis is it going to be that the person with whom the Children are living with, are they going to be getting the house? For example, otherwise, what's to happen with inheritances? What's to happen with gifts? What's to happen with other assets? What's to happen with, for example, if there's Children? So if Children are born, does that change what one of them would get or the other, do you effectively have clauses put in agreement? So that if they were to have one child and this is how they divide the assets. If they have two, if they have three, some people may not want that, they may just want it very generic. Other people may want it more specific. What about review clauses? How often should this pre agreement need to be reviewed? What's the position in terms of uh dispute? Is there an expectation for them to refer to arbitration, to mediation before they go to court? For example, what about severance? So if there is a offending clause in the agreement, which should not stand, does it mean that you can sever that clause and leave the rest of the agreement in place or does it vitiate the whole of the agreement? For example? So is that and also obviously because of the need to ensure there is sufficient disclosure, are you going to be a pending a schedule of assets and liabilities. Are you going to do it for me? Maybe make reference to a for me that's been exchanged between both of them to set out what the extent of the disclosure was and therefore uh sufficient evidence to suggest that the bulls had an awareness of each other's financial position. Ok. So you can see, you know, a number of key pointers that you need to think about when you're drafting these. And I would suggest have a look at the Law Commission report and the draft build that was put together back in February 2014. It's called ma on a Property Needs and Agreements of 27th of February 2014. So it is, you know, some 10 years old, but it's very useful because it pulls together a lot of the recommendations that the Law Commission at the time put together, which have not, of course been accepted by parliament at this stage. But nonetheless, it gives you some very useful pointers when it comes to uh drafting these agreements. So like I say, these agreements can provide that level of certainty instead of looking at the course of broad discretion. Uh it can be of assistance where there is uh ranging uh disparity of wealth between parties and it could be of assistance even in average wealth and even large wealth cases as well, of course. And also to provide some certainty, as we said, in the case of maybe subsequent marriage or civil partnership. Now, there was a more recent case on whether or not premarital agreement was to be upheld or not and that it didn't meet the reasonable needs of the party. And this was a case of HD. And uh WB uh this was a case last year in 2023. Uh and this was done by Mr Justice Pe and the question two questions his lordship said here were uh we were these uh firstly, uh the circumstances surrounding a prenuptial agreement, uh which was one that was signed on the day the parties got married. What weight if any should be attached to it. And then secondly, the exercise of de discretion under uh section 25. Now, both the husband and the wife here, they had excelled in their chosen uh sporting field. They had three Children, three minor Children and it was going to be effectively a shared care arrangement after the divorce. So they married uh and essentially it was a nine year marriage and the prenuptial agreement had the same date as the marriage. And uh what was the position then with this prenuptial agreement? Would the court uphold it? Well, this is where the husband raised real issues about the prenuptial agreement. He was saying that he should not be upheld. He said he, he felt confused at times it was wrong. He said um uh as as as to the agreement. So he felt confused as to really what the, the uh contents and the effect of the prenuptial agreement was. But this, the court really struggled with the stunning why her husband who was arguing this. And that's because even though he was saying he didn't understand it, he had had this agreement for several weeks, he had ample time to read it. In fact, he was quite short, it was only eight pages long. And the judge said that even a layperson would be able to get a broad gist of really what it's about. He'd even had discussions with the wife, the husband had, he even carried out amendments in fact, on three times on at least three occasions. So it's not that, you know, he didn't amend it. He sent it back three times and do amendments. So he was fully engaged in the process. He knew what the prenuptial agreement was. He was there to protect assets. He knew what would mean if he was to sign it. He was an intelligent man. He did carry out amendments. He went through it in some detail. He had ample opportunity to go through it and make amendments which he did. He even said to the wife that he had taken legal advice. Although later, it was discovered that he hadn't. But nonetheless, he had been given the opportunity to take legal advice, but he had decided not to. So the court was satisfied that uh he had gone through the agreement. He understood that it not only protected assets existing as at the time they got married, but also future assets as well. So his argument that he was confused and didn't understand what it was. That was incredible. Uh The clauses were relatively simple and therefore that argument on his part would not succeed. And before he did understand this agreement, and therefore the question was, um would it be upheld? And like I say, he had told his wife that he had taken legal advice actually on the facts. He had not done so. But nonetheless, he had had the opportunity to take advice, had he wanted to do so as for the financial disclosure, this was accurate in broad terms between the two of them, neither party attributed values to the businesses. Um And the court was satisfied that this prenuptial agreement was actually really entered into by each of them. There was a full appreciation of its meaning and consequences. There were no officiating factors. So why so on that basis, 1 may argue then, well, it should be upheld then. So the wife was arguing on that basis surely should uphold the agreement then. But a course said, no, the court said no, even though there were no vitiating factors, the judge nonetheless took the view that he would not uphold it. Why is that? Why did the judge take that view? Well, you remember I said earlier that in a number of cases, the courts have taken a view that even if there were no vitiating factors if allowing the agreement to stand in the manner in which it is, if it's going to be inherently unfair. So if it's going to leave one of them in a situation of a predicament of real need, then they're not going to give weight or much weight to it. And that was what happened here as well. So the provision for the husband in the agreement did not address his needs fairly. So six years of marriage, her husband was entitled under agreement mainly to 112,000 pounds repayment of 250,000 pounds and a su this wouldn't be enough to meet his house needs or income needs in a way which really represent their uh lifestyle for the previous 20 years. They hadn't talked about needs. Had there been lawyers instructed, maybe. Well, there was a real possibility that if they taught legal advice, then the lawyers would have talked specifically and avis them about needs and as to what their reasonable needs would be, but that wasn't really addressed in disagreement. And therefore on that basis, the court said that this was one of those cases where one should depart from the prenuptial agreement because it was not meeting the husband's needs fairly. So, of course, that would mean that the court would then be exercising its discretion under section 25 of the um of the MC A. So they would then be looking at section 25 looking at what's fair and reasonable uh in the uh circumstances, obviously, resources and in capacity needs lifestyle duration of citation contribution by both of them. And the court therefore, take all those factors into account in deciding what would be uh fair in the circumstances. OK. So you get a really useful case which looks at deposition surrounding optional agreements. And another case of last year was this one of Trns and Trnk. And this is one where the court was very concerned about this prenuptial agreement that was entered into on the basis that uh there was insufficient material disclosure provided in negotiating the the agreement. So this was hand done by sir Jonathan Coe in this case. So this was the husband who put in an application for notice to show cause as to why a postnuptial agreement that was signed a few as previously should not be up by the court and therefore made an order of the court. And uh the wife sought to resist on the basis that she was arguing that there was material non-disclosure on the part of the, the husband. OK. So the steps leading up to the postnuptial agreement with these, this is one where the parties exchanged financial details, the husband sent the wife his asset, she he'd prepared, showed the party's financial position. A wife returned this with uh disclosure on her part and both of them had signed this uh this postnuptial agreement and uh this recorded the parties intended that this postnuptial agreement was to be binding upon them in the event of permanent breakdown of the marriage. And that they considered that this agreement was fair and that they both had received independent legal advice as to the uh the postnuptial agreement. So therefore, there were those provisions there which uh had been set out uh in uh in this agreement in that regard. But later, the wife alleged non-disclosure. She said that um, after they'd signed up this agreement, um it came to light afterwards. And obviously, at the point at which the uh breakup of the marriage, she said it came to light afterwards that he, the husband had mishandled the tax filings by not disclosing the wife that he owned the property, uh, by not disclosing to it that he owned this other property and also by giving an incomplete list of the wife's U K's investments. So that was one of the issues he had, uh mishandled his tax filing. But secondly, uh the court, the wife was in really concerned that he hadn't made a proper full and frank disclosure of his financial position. Now, where do we stand with disclosure? Well, I'm going to be taking you through some of the conduct cases shortly and this is where one of the leading cases some of you will know is, uh, as, and as his lordship said that the due to disclose is not limited to assets which each party has at the date time that the disclosure is made. And in fact, one of the leading cases on disclosure is this case of Bolker Ingram and Bulker Ingram in 2009, where the court of appeal had to consider whether the husband should have disclosed at the time of the FDR the financial dispute resolution that he was negotiating a new contract for employment, albeit he had not signed it. And even though in that case as my wife were going through a divorce, they were negotiating on the finances, he was negotiating this lucrative employment contract which would put him in a much a stronger financial position than what he currently was. He did disclose that whilst he was negotiating on the finances and it was only after they negotiated and settled on the finances that he subsequently started this new job and the wife or now the ex-wife found out she applied to set aside the order. And even though it didn't make any difference to the outcome in terms of the financial award, the court be nonetheless emphasized that there is a general duty uh to disclose and here in those circumstances, if it is material facts, which here, arguably this was then the husband should have disclosed it. So should the same principle apply here when it came to negotiating the postnuptial agreement? And the court said yes, the court said that both the husband and wife did have a responsibility to give accurate information of the values of the properties and other assets they had right up until such time agreement was concluded. Only by doing so could the eco sharing of the family assets which both had sought to achieve be properly calculated? So therefore, on that basis, the court was satisfied that there was material non-disclosure by the husband in relation to his assets. Ok. We can see really, really important decision in so far as that's concerned right now. The other part of this course, as I mentioned, I'd like to take you through is some of the elements surrounding conduct, arguments that we run in financial remedy cases. So we're gonna be looking at the position here and we'll see how the law has developed in this field also. And I'm going to be taking you through uh conduct both in terms of litigation conduct, which then of course can have a bearing particularly when it comes to uh issues of a cost, for example. And also we're gonna be looking at conduct in so far as for the purpose of section 25 2 G, whereby it would then be conduct during a marriage or civil partnership, whereby it would then not be inequitable to disregard. Basically. So the first case then which emphasizes the need for the full effect disclosure is the Bulker Ingram case, the 2009 case that I've just mentioned. So remember this is the one where the husband was negotiating this new uh employment contract whilst he was going through the uh divorce and resolve the finances with his wife. So he failed to disclose this. Uh, and he didn't mention us at the, uh the FDR. And um this is where he resigned from his employment. About two weeks later, started his new job, a wife like say ex-wife didn't found out and she applied to set aside this order. And uh the court appeal did say that the uh husband should have therefore disclosed her wife to advance date of his negotiations for his change of employment, which was going to be paying him significantly more than what he was going to getting. And then if he had done so she would not have agreed to the order which she did agree to. I would have sought adjournment of the FDR. OK. So even though it did not make a difference on the eventual outcome, ultimately, the court nonetheless did emphasize and reiterate the point raised in the Jenkins and Liftgate case where in what was then absolutely pursues now, of course, financial uh order proceedings that uh the disclosure should be full and frank and all the relevant material facts should be disclosed in these circumstances. So again, very, very important points that was raised uh in this uh later decision. And the court did say that a duty is to have regard under section 25 to the income earning capacity, property resources, which each of them has was likely to have in the foreseeable future. And that's where you can see. Therefore, uh he therefore had to disclose this in terms of changing these circumstances, financial circumstances in the foreseeable future. And that disclosure therefore, was essential to assess his future prospects. And he stands beyond what's said on the date that water is made in that regard. Ok. So you can see this case very much emphasizes that this duty of disclosure should be interpreted very widely. And therefore, if there is any doubt, it's better therefore to err on the side of caution and therefore to uh to disclose in those circumstances. So again, very significant decision in that regard. Now, as you know, there's been a number of cases there which I've looked at emphasizing the need for full and frank disclosure and some of you will be aware that in 2015, there were these two significant Supreme Court decisions, there was the Shain and Shanon case and the Gold Hill and Gold Hill decisions, both in the Supreme Court decided in the same year. Uh So in both cases, uh the respective husbands had agreed with their respective wives as to uh the division of the assets. So there had been or pretty much equal division of assets by way of financial consent orders. But it's only afterwards that the uh the, the, the, the uh ex former wives in both cases discovered that their husbands respectively had lied as to their financial position. They had provided material non disclosure. And uh, therefore, they set aside, they apply to set aside those financial consent orders on a basis of material uh, non-disclosure. Uh So in the, uh, go Hill case, for example, a couple were divorced, her husband had been convicted of offenses related to fraud and mind laundering. They said they had entered into his consent order. But the wife later saw two sets aside on the basis of material on disclosure. And she said that the law really needed to address the issue of spouses as in this case, hiding assets when there were divorce proceedings and the court was satisfied to go. Uh, and, and like I say, set aside both of these financial consent orders and for the cases, both of them then to be reviewed which they were now if there is material non disclosure and say the application is then made for the order to be set aside or let's say even doing proceedings, there is litigation conduct in the form of one is not disclosing assets when they should. And we're thinking of a situation where say the form is incomplete, uh, say, uh the questionnaires are incomplete as a schedule of deficiencies information which should be disclosed is not being disclosed. The court has made orders for disclosure and yet the person still has not disclosed in those circumstances that this is where in terms of conduct. And in terms of litigation conduct, this is where 1 may then be looking at costs and this is where part 28 of the F pr then comes into play. So you'll be aware that rule 28.1 of the F pr provides that the court may make uh at any time such a drastic costs as it thinks fit. And what's the position then with the costs in financial remedy proceedings, which as you know, isn't just financial orders. But also for example, schedule one of the Children Act applications. Well, when 28.3 of the F pr provides uh the the the sets out a position in relation to costs and financial remedy proceedings. And the general rule as to costs subject to subsection six under rule 28.3 subparagraph five is that the court would not make an order requiring one part to pay the cost or the other. Now, the general rule as you know, would be where you're looking at the applications typically for financial orders. So the general rule is uh no order as to costs subject to subsection uh six. So the general rule like I say would be applicable to say financial order applications, just periodical payments, lump sum property adjustment, pension sharing orders. Ok. So the general rule therefore does not apply to, for example, maintenance pending suit applications, applications for interim periodical payments, uh legal services orders, for example, under section 22 Z A uh interim orders such as maybe disclosure or sort of specific applications for disclosure documents. For example, part 25 applications for the instruction of experts, uh applications for strikeout, for example, applications for notice to show cause. Um should one of the Children Act claims appeals or a financial remedy application, the cost of a third party being joined enforcement and maybe an application under section 37 of MC A ie the voice of disposition where somebody is being injuncted to prevent them from disposing of an asset or if they have already done so for the funds from that to be brought back into the pot. So those kinds of application that generally the costs does not apply to the core can make such order as they see fit and typically you're finding those kind of applications. So for example, say a section 37 MC, a application, if the person who's applied is successful, they may well get an order on the other side pays the cost of that application. But the general rule lightly when say one is divorcing and it's inevitable that one would then want to reorder finances associated with that. So hence one lodges an application for financial order to general. The under 28.3 sub paragraph five is an order as the costs. But remember this is subject to subparagraph six, subsection six. So subsection six provides that the court may order one party to pay the cost of another at any stage of the proceedings? Were it considered it appropriate to do so because of the conduct of the party in relation to proceedings both before or during them? So this basically confirms that even in that situation where there is no general order for general rule, the cost is no order as a cost, generally the core can do so due to litigation conduct. Ok. And in so far as that's concerned, if you then look at 28.3 subparagraph seven, that sets out the kind of circumstances where you may then get that where you may get aspects surrounding, for example, litigation conduct. So you can see here under rule 28.3 subparagraph seven, it sets out the factors which can and will then protect and deciding whether to order costs such as any failure to comply by parts, to comply with these rules, any order of the court or practice direction which the court considers relevant. So as you can see if somebody's not complying with orders, they're not doing their for me when they should have done or it's incomplete. So they might trust to be adjourned or they haven't done their questionnaires or they haven't provided for disclosure what they should have done. So that's where as you know, for that litigation conduct, the court can make cost orders. If it needs to be any open offer to settle, made by a party safe, there's an open offer to settle and the party refusing that so the court can take that into account whether it was reasonable for a party to pursue a or contest a particular allegation or issue. So that could be very relevant where sometimes parties may raise arguments which really have very little basis. And this was certainly the case uh in the um the case of HD and WB that case by Mr Justice Peel that I mentioned in January 2013, the one where her husband was arguing that he didn't understand that prenup of that agreement that they signed up to, even though he had signed it as, even though he had amended it three times and sent it back and had actually spent some time, you know, carrying out some substantial changes to it. So something like that where the court may and indeed, in that case, they made a cross order against it also subparagraph D A man in which a party has pursued a responded to the application of particular allegation and any other aspect in relation to a party's conduct which the court considers relevant. And of course, the court will also take into account the financial effect on the parties running costs order. So clearly, if it's going to cause undue burden upon them in a way where they are realistically not going to be able to meet uh the uh the, the, the, the cost in a reasonable way, then clear, that's a factor which the court would then have to also take into account alongside the other factors. Ok. Now, so if the general rule does not apply, then what does, so this is where 28.1 applies. So the court may make such order as it sees fit. So as I said, with applications for say under schedule one of the Children act strike out and so forth, the court may well then make cast orders in those circumstances if appropriate. So if there have been orders made for somebody to disclose documentation on the basis that it's alleged that there uh disclosure is deficient. But if they fail to do so, then this is where sometimes the court may then go further and make specific orders uh for, for disclosure in those circumstances. And if they fail to do so, there may well be a penal notice attached. Uh There may be an application for contempt and the court can, of course, under contempt of Court Act of 81 impose a fine or certain custodial sentence if appropriate. And that's what happened in this case of Thursfield, this 2013 decision we're here. Uh There had been orders for disclosure made against her husband, uh whereby he had failed uh to provide full disclosure. Uh He failed to comply with those orders and the wife brought proceedings against the husband for mile due to contempt of court. Uh And her husband argued that he had very little assets available. Uh, and, uh, he said that he was no longer in the situation financially that he had been previously, but the court was not satisfied on that and they were satisfied as to why successfully, uh, was able to prove to show them that. In fact, he had hidden some of these assets, but he was failing to disclose as to where they were. Um, she claimed that he had either of these assets yet put him in trust in his new wife's name or they were otherwise placed elsewhere. Uh And the court did decide to make an order against him for contempt. So in fact, under contempt of court, he was held in contempt. And uh the court emphasized that they could potentially therefore imprison him for a period of up to two years with an unlimited uh si uh fine also. And the court did decide that in fact, he was in contempt. Uh He also had failed to attend court and the court wanted to ensure that this sentence was going to be at the higher end. Uh So therefore would impose a two year sentence on him. The 1st 12 months was a punitive sentence basically to punish him for his contempt. And a second would also be imposed the remaining 12 months, hopefully to ensure that he would then provide full and prompt compliance. So he can see the maximum two year sentence was imposed in those circumstances. Now, there's been other cases where courts have once again due to conduct, decided to make costs orders and also have set aside, uh, orders. This was the case of neil o'neil in 2019. And, uh, this was an application this time by the husband, uh, to set aside an order for determination of the amount for which the wife was liable to him in relation to his share of the process of the former home. He was basically asking for the consent order that they had put, agreed and signed up to, to be set aside. And essentially what was happening is that the wife had lawyers but the husband was self representing. So he was a litigant in person. He didn't want to instruct lawyers. Wife had lawyers and uh they put together a draft consent, financial consent order for consideration of the husband. And um this is one where uh the wife then got her lawyers to amend the terms of disorder without the husband's consent. So essentially what happened is they put together a financial consent order. She said that she would take it to her husband and uh because he was not liaising with the lawyers, uh he, he wasn't seeing his own lawyers, he wasn't responding to his wife's lawyers uh um to the wife's lawyers. She said, look, if you give me the agreement, I'll go and see him and talk to him about this. So she did, she took it with her with her, she amended it herself. I didn't explain this to him. And uh, he, he signed it. He was very naive. He signed it without realizing really what, what she had done in that she had been deliberately dishonest. So he signed this, which effectively was going to be providing for her to get a much greater reward than, uh, it appeared otherwise, uh, this was signed, uh, filed at court and then when he later failed to comply with his obligations under the agreement, and he was confused as to why, uh, his wife was then saying, well, he hasn't complied with his obligations that it all came out and this is where it came out that in fact, his wife had been dishonest. She had, um, with her, his knowledge actually amended that agreement, that draft order and got him to sign it. Uh, he was very naive. Uh, the court said, and she had been incredibly dishonest in the circumstances. And, um, if he had instructed lawyers, then the wise deceit would have most likely been exposed anyway. But like I say, he hadn't instructed lawyers. So this had not been discovered. Uh, he denied that he had signed a consent order, but obviously he had done, he had his signature on there, but to be fair to him, he did really appreciate what he had signed in that regard. And, uh, so when he didn't pay the maintenance and the wife tried to enforce that, this is where it was found that she had been thoroughly dishonest. Um, the court said that his naivety wasn't a crime. This was a feature of financial remedy proceedings, but dishonesty was sadly a regular feature of financial remedy proceedings. And, uh, his lordship said he hadn't come across a court order obtained by fraud in a way that this was obtained. This was conduct in the most serious nature for the purpose of section 25 DG. And therefore, the court would not disregard this. And therefore, the court did in fact set aside a consent order and uh obviously what the wife was seeking and the order she would not be getting. And uh, there was also a cost order made against the wife as well. So the court decided now on a clean break, um, the, the court was minded to even consider reporting the wife to the uh director of public prosecutions, but she had already served a uh eight month sentence for contempt and uh decided therefore, the fact not to do so. Uh but she was ordered to pay uh, the husband's costs on an indemnity basis. So again, you can see a very substantial outcome in so far as uh deposition uh going forward. So you can see, you know, some very, very important cases here insofar as conduct in particularly when it comes to conduct, which then has an impact, insofar as uh costs are concerned. But let's also spend some time in looking at the position surrounding uh conduct in the marriage. So how does this then compute insofar as the court then deciding on what award he or she should then be getting insofar as that's concerned. Well, this is where the law does provide that the court will only take into account conduct where it would be inequitable to disregard uh for the purposes of section 25 2 G of the 73 Act. So basically, it's this conduct such that it is uh gross and obvious, such that it must in those circumstances be brought into account. So that's very much what the, the test is. Uh one of the uh significant uh cases on this which some of you will be aware of. It's this case of H and H financial relief, attempted murder as conduct as 2006 case husband stabbed his wife several times. She was a police officer. Thankfully, she survived, he stabbed her several times, she was unable to return to work for the rest of her, of her life. Uh It was such uh serious injuries that she sustained both physically and mentally and uh this was his conduct was very much at the very top end of the scale because of its financial consequences. Obviously, having a significant effect on the wife's uh uh career prospects and her employability going forward. And therefore, that was taken to account for the purpose of section 25 2 G which led to the wife getting the majority of the financial assets. The husband of course, was serving a lengthy prison sentence. He was still given an award of some 30,000 pound if I remember. Uh but the wife got the majority of the assets which was closer to about 970,000 pounds, which includes the family home. There's been other cases also where conduct has been taken to account whereby the court has regarded it has been uh such that it would be inequitable to disregard. And this was in the case of FRB and DC A number two. This was a case whereby a husband or wife had been married uh for some 14 years, that one child who was around nine years of age and um both were very, very uh wealthy uh as were their families, their, their, their families were so husband side were billionaires, so very wealthy families. Uh They had a substantial, um very, very high standard of living, substantial properties around the world and her husband had a lot of premarital, externally provided assets more so from his, his side of the family, uh such that the court concluded that it would be fair to say about 25% of the total wealth was to be regarded that the husband had as being non marital on the basis of what had been provided to him by his family. And what this case was about was they had one child, which for that time, during a marriage, the husband believed he was the father. Uh, but unfortunately, during the latter stage of the marriage, it came to light. He found out that in fact, he wasn't even the father. So DNA testing was carried out. And sadly, um, he discovered that he wasn't a father and he challenged his wife about this who admitted, she said yes, I knew that you weren't the father at the material time. I was seeing somebody else. You didn't know about it. And, um, and yes, you're not a father, but I just didn't tell you as you can imagine how devastated he is, uh, believing that he was the father of the child that he wasn't. And, and more so the fact that his wife had lied to him for these years. So he decided to divorce. He brought proceedings under a tort of deceit which were not pursued and thrown out. He then pleaded conduct ie paternity fraud for the purpose of section 25 2 G. So he wanted that taken into account by the court when it came to the, uh, division of the, uh, the family assets. And I talked the court took the view that the husbands um, argument in terms of paternity fraud was such, that would be such that it would be inequitable to disregard. And if on that base, the court was going to be taking that into account. But then that had to be balanced against the fact that the husband himself had failed to disclose some of the mari material assets and that had been s uh seriously deficient on his part. Uh So effectively his conduct in terms of litigation conduct and fail to disclose, balanced out the wife's conduct insofar as the paternity fraud. So one effectively canceled out the other. And if the court wasn't going to be subjecting the wife to a double jeopardy, so to speak. And in that regard, what the court therefore decided was that in deducting, therefore, uh the um 25% from the assets in terms of the um the non marital assets. So taking that out, that left a marital quest of 100 and 28 million. And uh therefore, the husband's conduct like say balance that the wife in terms of the paternity fraud, there were no other reasons to uh depart from equality and therefore, the court effectively split the assets 5050 therefore the wife would get 64 million and the husband would get the other plus on top of that, there was a child periodical payments as well, which would also be granted. And the budgets for that judge described as eye watering figures in that regard, as you can see, for example, clothing and holiday costs uh for this nine year old chart at 100,000 pounds per and I but, ok, so again, a very useful case which looks at again, the issue of uh conduct. And finally, for today, I just wanted to mention one other case, uh which also looks at the issue of conduct. This is uh also looking at economic abuse, this is the recent case of DP and ep this 2023 decision and this is one where about a husband or wife had been married for some years and um uh for some 17 years, they had Children who were now independent and um that had been cohabiting for a period of time also prior to that. And he, and he discovered the husband discovered some years which later, which led to the breakup of the marriage. And in fact, his wife was already married. In fact, before she even met him, she was already married and in fact, she never divorced. So she was effectively living a double life. So therefore, the husband didn't pursue a divorce. He pursued nullity on the basis that the marriage to him was of course void ie his wife was not free to marry. Therefore, the marriage was void, pursued section 11 of MC A 1973. So he went for nullity, but of course, that does allow you to pursue a financial order also, which is what he did. And he claimed a B A. He firstly said, well, look, there should be a b because all these years that he was living with her and on this purported marriage, um she was reckless you deliberately dissipating from the party's resources, the money ie she was spending a lot of the money from their joint resources that they had spending on her first husband. So he wanted that added back basically. And he also said that the wife had undisclosed assets to buy from the funds which she, he said she had diverted and hidden over the course of the relationship. And the other key point he raised the husband raised was conduct. He said that the worst conduct was such that it would be elected with of God on the basis that her conduct managed to economic abuse. And that is what he argued and bearing in mind, the domestic abuse sector 2021. And what he was effectively arguing is that she exploited her dominant position. Um If not, he was really working, he was giving all the money he had to, to his wife. He assumed that she was investing this for their future, for both of them, but actually unaware to him. Uh she was actually directly taking the money and using it for her own purposes with her first husband. So he felt a sense of betrayal and her actions meant that she was exploiting him financially by really taking the monies beyond his reach in that regard. So he can see therefore how it was being argued that this was uh economic abuse uh in that regard. And the court did say that yes, they would take this into account as a form of abuse. And therefore, on this basis, it would be such that it would be initable disregard if this wasn't therefore going to be taken into account. So if that basis, the court did say that they would take this into account, which they did and that led to uh the court therefore not dividing the assets 5050. Now, the problem here was this was a case whereby it was a modest income case. And therefore, there wasn't really much the judge in terms of leeway, the judge could do therefore to divide the assets because we needs, needs to be met as did the husbands and the court would divide the assets on the base of still meeting the modest needs of the wife. So effectively here, the court divide the assets on the basis that husband would get some 53% of the total assets and the wife would therefore get the other 47%. So even though conduct was taken into account in the form of economic abuse for the purpose of section 25 2 G, the net effect though ultimately was that it did lead to a departure from equality but not as significantly as what 11 would have otherwise thought. And that's simply because this was a modest income case as opposed to a, a big money case. And therefore really it wasn't that flexibility. The judge had to be able to attach that level of discretion that otherwise they would have done. Ok. So that brings us to the end of this session also. So you can see again, we've covered a number of issues on nuptial agreements and also on conduct. So in the last session, I'll be really looking at some of the remaining cases on conduct just to try and pull this together for you. So I'll speak to you soon. Thanks very much. Bye for now.
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