Hello and welcome to this webinar on behalf of data law. Uh My name is Colleen Beaumont. Uh This hour long webinar is entitled Case law for Criminal Practitioners. A 2023 update before I start this particular webinar. I just want to draw your attention to the other webinars uh that I've recorded for data law this year. And obviously, they'll be available through data law. There's criminal legislation, a 2023 update, a criminal evidence, a 2023 update and advising clients at the police station in 2023. So please do visit the um the data law website and find out more about how you can gain access uh to those uh webinars that I've already done. So dealing with this particular webinar, uh We've got 20 slides with four bullet points per slide. So let's go to the first slide and the first slide, it deals with the court of appeal decision of Rex. And kh the appellant was convicted of two offenses of inciting a child to engage in sexual activity whilst, whilst he himself was under the age of 18 and he was 17. The judge was told by council that there were no guidelines apart from the adult guidelines uh published by the Senate in Council, the Court of the PS A strictly speaking, uh, that wasn't correct because there are guidelines, there have been guidelines with effect from the first of April 2014, uh, covering those offenders who fall within, uh, section 13 of the sexual offenses Act of 2003. Section 13. Of course, informs us that a person 17 or be up can commit, uh the same offense as could have been committed by an adult under sections uh 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Act, you'll notice if you were to look at section 9 10, 11 and 12 of the sexual offenses act 2003 that they all speak in terms of the offender being 18 or over. But of course, if you're 17 or below who look, uh one must have regard to section 13 which informs us that a person 17 or below can commit the same type of offenses as could have been committed by the adults and the sections 9, 10, 11 and 12. But because the offender is 17 or below, the penalties are that much lower. We also know, don't we from overarching principles, the sentencing of Children and young people, a a very important document on the sentencing council website published on the first of June 2017. Um the guidance or the guidelines that say, do they not that the judges do consider the adult guideline and then to apply the appropriate percentage reduction when the judge is sentencing a child, someone 17 more than that. And the overarching principles document says that the judge should consider something in the region of perhaps a half to two thirds of the sentence that would have been appropriate for the adult in terms of quantum. And if the young child happens to be 17, 16 or 15, and if the child happens to be below 15, 14 or below, uh perhaps something in the region of a half of that, which would have been appropriate for the adult and is the appropriate sentence to give. But we know, don't we, the court of appeal have also told us that um the judge does not have to follow that guidance. Uh Mathematically, there was one particular case in which the judge merely gave 25% and the court of appeal said, well, no, we're not going to alter this because it's clearly a matter of judge sentencing, of course, is an art, not a science. And those um those guidelines are, are guidelines which of course may be followed, uh may not be followed so long as the judge um does it correctly, uh the court of appeal will not interfere even though uh strictly speaking, the percentage as perhaps recommended by the document that wasn't given in full slide. Two, the queen on the application of Alimi application in person for permission to grant judicial review in the High Court permission to appeal against conviction and the sentence in the crown court had been refused on the papers and also refused by the full court Court of Appeal Criminal Division. So having exhausted that loot Court of appeal, criminal division, the claimant then sought judicial review of those decisions made by the court of appeal and the High Court could not assess. I said no in those circumstances. Section 29 subsection three of the Senior Courts Act 1981 the High Court has no jurisdiction in matters relating to trials on indictment. The appellate vote from the crown court on matters relating to trials on indictment is to the court of appeal, criminal division. It does not lie to the High Court. And of course, the um the applicant having um exhausted the um appellate boot uh was precluded from having the High Court look at these matters. Slide three Bh and Norwich Youth Court and the CPS as interested part, a very important um high court decision 2023. This was a challenge by way of judicial review against the decision of the district judge to accept jurisdiction in three rapes in the youth court. Both the prosecution and the defense made representations that jurisdiction should be declined. And the matter sent to the crown Court for trial. Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 the court said this was the court agreeing with the decision of the district judge to accept jurisdiction. The court said that in most cases, it is likely to be impossible to decide whether there's a real prospect that a sentence in excess of two years detention will be imposed at that early stage, having merely had representations from the parties in the case. And that decision was probably best made at the end of the case uh when the uh Youth Court had heard the trial and so the judicial review uh was refused and the High Court were not prepared to interfere with the decision of the district judge to accept jurisdiction. Um On these three very serious uh rape charges such that there should be a trial in the Youth Court. The prosecution of course had made representations that upon conviction, the sentence would fall outside any guidelines available. The defense agreed with those representations and also said that the matter was too complex uh for anything anywhere other than the crown court. Hm. It's never going to go down bay. Where is it? The district judge? Uh when you tell that judge that he or she should um not accept jurisdiction in the case because the matters are too complex. Mm So there you are, it's an important high court decision, isn't it telling us effectively? Now that the decision doesn't necessarily have to be made at the beginning, the decision could be made at the end if there's a conviction after a trial, the Youth Court does have full powers to commit to the crown Court sentence if it really considers that a sentence in excess of a two year detention and training is the most appropriate sentence. I'm sure you know that the sentencing Act 2020 it's section 16, uh which gives the Youth Court the power to commit for sentence if they're dealing with what we used to call a grave crime, but we now have to call it a serious offense under the sentencing Act 2020 they can commit for sentence. And of course, the judge upon sentencing at the crown court could if he or she wanted to impose something called long term detention under section 250 of the sentencing Act 2020. How long is it going to be? Well, it's certainly going to be in excess of two years because of course, if it was going to be two years of anger, then the sentence imposed on the young, the youth would be a detention and training order. So it's going to be something more than two years. Of course, it could be anything up to the maximum that the offense carries um on indictment. But as we looked at uh just a few moments ago in deciding the quantum of sentence, the judge should have regard to the percentage reductions. Um as mentioned in that guideline document from the Sentencing Council overarching principles, the sentencing of Children and young people slide four SOTO and Weight has been rather overtaken by events. I know it's a 2023 decision but um please go onto the sentencing council website if you haven't already done. So, uh new guidelines, new guidelines um in relation to many uh motoring offenses uh including um including these uh offenses as well operative from the first of July 2023. So having a look at SOTO and weight, it was a consideration by the court of appeal. Her applications by the solicitor general to refer her sentences imposed for causing death by dangerous driving as being unduly lenient. The cases were not, they were not codependents. These cases were unrelated, say that both required consideration of section 86 of the peace crimes sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Section 86 increased the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving and for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs increased the sentence for 14 years to life in the case of weight. The sentencing judge said, well, bearing in mind the maximum penalty is now life as opposed to 14 years. I'm going to take as my starting point, not the eight years mentioned in the guidance for a category one fence, I'm going to take as my starting 0.12 years rather than eight years. And the court of appeal uh considered a number of issues in the case, but one of the issues was, they said yes. Uh this was uh quite appropriate uh bear in mind the increase of essentially some 14 years um to life, as I said, it's rather been overtaken by events in that anyone's sentence on or after the first of July this year. Anyway, will have the court will of course have recourse to the new sentencing guidelines operative from the first of July, concerning both this offense causing death by dangerous driving and many other motor uh guide guidelines as well. I think there are 12, 12 new guidelines uh concerning um serious motoring offenses and in that document. So please, if you haven't done so please get onto the sentencing Council website and have a look at it. I five Edwards, a 2022 Court of appeal decision submissions made in the court of appeal that there should have been some reduction in the term of the rather than the suspended sentence as it were having been activated in full. The submission was that the reduction should have been given to reflect the time spent out of trouble even if no unpaid work under the order had been completed unpaid work. Of course, being one of the requirements within the suspended sentence that had been imposed. The court of appeal said that the submissions were wrong in principle. How could it be said that he'd failed to keep out of trouble when he'd failed to attend his initial appointment with the probation service on no fewer than 15 separate occasions. And so they had absolutely no issue uh with the judge activating the suspended sentence order in full side six, Regina and a np an important case concerning loss of evidence. The issue here was whether or not the loss of evidence in the case meant that a fair trial was no longer possible such that the proceedings should be stayed as an abusive process. The defense made the appropriate application to the crown court judge that the fai should be stayed. And the crown court judge said he would, he was minded to grant the application and thought that as a result of evidence which had been lost, the defendant could no longer be given a fair trial. Well, the crown were not happy with that as you can well imagine. And they took the decision of the judge as a terminating ruling within section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and appealed that ruling to the court of appeal. You may or may not know that since 2003 B prosecution have been able to have decisions of crown court judges reviewed by the court of appeal. If that judge's decision effectively terminates the crown's case at the crown court. Like for example, upholding a submission of no case to answer. Uh like for example, uh making certain rulings in relation to the inadmissibility of evidence, whereby the crown's case collapses like for example, making a ruling that the proceedings should be stayed as an abusive process. The offenses uh related to rape, sexual assault samples and swabs taken from the complainant and underwear were all lost body worn. Camera footage was not retained such that there was no video recording of C's first complaint. The court of appeal looked at the matter carefully and said, uh no, with respect, judge, uh we come to a different conclusion. We think the judge fell into error. There remain, there remained sufficient evidence such that the defendant could still have a fair crime. Despite the loss of evidence, it wasn't as if there was an evidential vacuum. Uh There was other evidence remaining and on that basis, the defendant could be afforded a fair trial and the judge could deal with the uh loss of evidence issues in the um summing up to the jury at the end of the case slide, seven Saunders and Bristol Magistrates, a 2022 high court decision acclaimed by way of judicial review against the decision of two justices to grant a prosecution application to a journal trial. The prosecution had failed to comply with the direction to serve the evidence of a witness or warned him to attend the defense argument that the was that the um the German was there w for unreasonable. It wasn't a failure of the CPS as such. It was a failure on the admin side. But of course, the crown being the prosecuting authority and they bear the responsibility, do they not? The divisional court decided that the decision to adjourn was vitiated by two public law failures and there was a failure to give adequate reasons for the adjournment. And there was apparent bias in the case uh based upon um comments that one of the justices has made, had made, I believe in the retiree group and therefore their decision to adjourn was quashed by the high court. It's an interesting, it's an interesting read, not least as it were in relation to the um the comments that were apparently made. So, uh if you get a chance, do um do you have a read of the full judgment slide? Eight Haywood and Raymond, both defendants whilst not contradicting their earlier preprepared statements upon testifying mentioned and relied upon details not mentioned in their earlier statement. Prosecution invited the judge to invite the jury to consider the drawing of adverse influences from these novel issues that had not been mentioned earlier. The defense opposed the application. No probative evidence had been used to show that a relevant question had been posed to the interview designed to elicit these points. The defense argument was that the interviews, the interviews should have been adduced. The interview should have been adduced in relation to the questions that were put to them. The argument was rejected by the Crown Court judge and rejected by the court of appeal and said no, the individual. It was their opportunity to mention the sailor facts relied upon and it wasn't as it were dependent upon questions being asked designed to elicit those sail facts regardless of the nature of the questioning we know, don't we that if suspects in their interview or by means of preprepared statements, if they don't, men should facts that they're later going to rely upon as part of their defense at trial, then adverse influences may be drawn. Gosh, that's been the case for many a year. The interview is your opportunity to mention the facts upon which you would seek to rely. It is not, it is not dependent on the officers asking questions designed to elicit particular facts upon which you later seek to rely the court of appeal making a couple of obvious points. Firstly, surely the more important the fat the defendant would want to rely upon a crime. Well, the more he or she would mention that at the police station stage and gosh, the second point made by the court of appeal, it may be that questions couldn't have been asked in relation to drawing out a particular fact because that particular fact was not even known to the interviewing officers. 59 Regina and Wallace, a siege were irregularities. In so far as getting cases from the Magistrates court to the crown court, the defendant was sent to the Crown Court on a burglary. Fair enough, he had to be sent section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 he was three strike. We know, don't we that if your three strikes, if you're subject to the consideration of a mandatory minimum, three year sentence of the crown, or then the offense becomes indictable only at the Magistrates court stage. You don't deal with allocations sending you just send it as though you were sending an offense which is indictable only. He was also sent undertaking of a motor vehicle without consent rightly. So we now don't be section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Indicted offenses and either way offenses and summer offenses may all be sent under section 51. If there's a nexus, if they arise out of the same facts, offenses of driving whilst disqualified and driving with excess alcohol should also have been sent pursuant to section 51 because there was a nexus a cake according to the court neck guilty pleas were taken and these were committed for sentence. You can't do that. The sentencing Act 2020 does not permit you to commit for sentence, summary offenses at the same time as sending someone for trial, can't do it. And if you go me, please do have a read of the relevant committal sentence. Sections of the sentencing Act 2020 they are sections 14 through to 24 please if you haven't already done. So go onto the website legislation dot gov dot UK and download and save to your device. The Sentencing Act 2020 have a read and familiarize yourselves with those commit all for sentence sections 14 through to 24 the Committee for Centers was simply not lawful and yet the judge at the Crown Court had reported to sentence on them, but there was no power to sentence on them because they had not arrived at the Crown court lawfully. And so the court here reconstituted itself as a divisional call of the Queen's bench and quash that unlawful committal for sentence from the magistrate to the crown court and said to the crown, they are with quash the committal for sentence any sentence imposed by the crown court judge on those offenses now simply falls away those summary only matters remain in the Magistrates court. It being left to the crown to decide uh what to do with them so far as pursuing them further in the Magistrates court. So I can the case of Hammon, the matter went to the court to appear on the issue of the somewhat limited scope of a crown court judge to withdraw a defense from the jury. Had the judge been righted, the defense was duress. And the crown court judge had said that as a matter of law, the defendant cannot avail himself of the defense of jus on these facts. And the facts are quite simple. The US case was that the appellant had walked out of an open prison because he had been told that he would be taken care of in a menacing way, he'd be taken care of if he reported sexually inappropriate suggestions that had been made to him by another prisoner. And the port of the duress defense, uh, was that the defendant was going to say that he feared serious bodily harm as a result of the threats that it be made to him that he would be taken care of. And those threats so dominated his thoughts uh that it led him to commit the crime of walking out of an open prison. It is a crime to walk out of an open prison. The court of appeal said, no, this is a million miles away from duress. Why nothing would have happened at all to the appellant unless he'd reported the inappropriate suggestions, which he had not. So how could he say that he was at fear of serious harm? He would only be subject to serious harm in the event of reporting the comments and he hadn't reported the comments anyway. So the court of appeal said the judge had been quite right to withdraw this defense from the jury. Be careful with the defense of us. Um It is a common law of defense and of course, the uh the defense has to be raised satisfactorily in an evidential fashion. And if the judge takes the view that the defense has not been raised evidentially, uh the judge can take that defense from the jury, which is exactly what happened. It's troublesome, isn't it? If a judge starts taking a defense away from the jury because it hasn't been evidentially raised uh to the sufficient level slide. 11. Um I'm not sure of the pronunciation. I'll say do, do do a 2022 court of appeal decision at dealing with qualifying curfews nine hours or more per day, uh monitored by a tag. The curfew amounted to a qualifying curfew engaging section 3 to 5 of the sentencing Act 2020. The section provides a course that the court must direct that the credit period is to count as time serve as part of the sentence. The credit period is the number of days divided by two and rounded up to the nearest number for the purposes of the case. It is incumbent upon the parties appearing in the court of the prosecution and the defense to bring to the attention of the court any time spent on a qualifying curfew where a custodial sentence is imposed by qualifying. Of course, we mean those curfews of nine hours or more per day monitored by an and no doubt the court will make the appropriate direction for sentence to be reduced by however many days. And we know don't we defendants are entitled to a half a day reduction in their sentence for every day spent subject to a qualifying curfew side 12. Yet another case dealing with the extension of a disqualification from driving where both the term of custody and a disqualification are imposed. We've had a number of feeds. In this case, the judge fell into error by reducing the overall disqualification period to take into account the three months during which the appellant was subject to an interim order. There's no need to do that judge any disqualification which you impose starts on the date of its pronouncement and will be automatically backdated to the date when the interim disqualification was first imposed. The judge also was in error in that he referred to the disqualification period as starting on the appellant's release from custody. No, the disqualification period starts today. The date of its pronouncement, it will automatically be updated to the date of any interim ban. And of course, the judge is obliged to extend any period of disqualification to cover the incarceration period of the defendant where both the disqualification from bribing and custody are imposed. Let me give you a simple illustration. Imagine for the offense of dangerous driving, the judge wanted to impose two years. Gosh, it's a harsh sentence. Two years maximum on indictment is two years. The judge also wants to disqualify for two years. We know don't be dangerous driving. Uh carries an obligatory disqualification of 12 months plus an extended reten. So just been given two years. Judge wants to impose a disqualification of two years. The pronouncement is this disqualification which starts today will be for a period of two years with a one year, a one year extension making a total disqualification term of three years. But in so far as the first year of that three year ban, the defendant will be in custody. Anywhere. This being a determined sentence. If you've just been sentenced to two years, he'd been in custody for a year and he'll be licensed for a year. So rather than the judge say that the disqualification period would start the appellant's release. That's not true. It's just that, that two year ban effectively begins to bite at the point of release, but it starts on the date of its pronouncement and must be extended to cover any period spent in custody as part of the sentence. Most of the time the extension will be two years. But on occasion, it might be an extension of more than a half of the sentence. It might be up to the two thirds half of the sentence we know, don't we? Certain offenders now given four years or more at the crown court, they have to serve two thirds of their sentence rather than a half. So judge find out how long he's going to serve and then extend your disqualification to cover the incarceration period. He is to deprive no benefits of the fact that he's in custody and cannot drive the disqualification period must not be allowed as it were to elapse whilst he's in custody. Otherwise he's de deriving a benefit from that he couldn't drive anywhere. He's in custody size 13 vagina and Cook, a very important case from the Court of appeal giving us sentencing guidelines concerning the offense of non fatal strangulation. The new offense that came into force police crime. No. Um the new offense came into force seventh of June 7th of June last year. Court of Appeal of course, gave us guidelines because there are as yet no formal guidelines from the sentencing Council in relation to this fence. And what did appeal say in this guideline judgment? Well, the important parts of the judgment are paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, ordinarily, the sentence will be one of immediate custody with the starting point of 18 months increased or decreased thereafter. List of aggravating or mitigating factors. Gosh, I can't see many Magistrates retaining the case by way of sentence. Can you we know don't we that they don't have 12 months anymore, do they? Because that 12 months was reduced to their former maximum power of six months to anyone sentenced on or after the 30th of March 2023. But if your starting point is 18 months, you really are coming down, aren't you to arrive at a six month sentence? Ordinarily, the sentence will be one of immediate custody with a starting point of 18 months increased or decreased thereafter. I just wonder how many people will be sentenced in the magistrate's court following the judgment in court slide 14 Regina and Nazir are referenced by his Majesty's Attorney General or Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988. Leave to refer an unduly lenient sentence. We know, don't we? If the solicitor general considers the sentences, not only lenient, it is unduly lenient. He or she may refer that particular sentence uh to the court of appeal for consideration. So what is the definition there of an unduly lenient sentence? Well, they said in the case of Nazir, a sentence is unduly convenient where it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge applying his mind to all the relevant factors could reasonably consider appropriate regard must always be had to reported cases. And in particular to the guidance given in this court from time to time in so-called guideline cases also regard must always be had to sentencing Council guidelines. However, said the court of appeal, it must always be remembered that sentencing isn't art rather than a science and that leniency is not in itself a vice. A judge can be lenient in the sentence that he or she imposes court of appeal will only interfere if they consider in all the circumstances that the sentence was just unduly lenient uh Regina and mark a 2023 court of appeal decision. The basis of this appeal was that the judge was wrong to direct the jury that they were entitled to treat the evidence of each of two complainants as being cross admissible. The case often quoted in this area of course, is a case of chopra. And the above case emphasized the importance of ensuring that the possibility of collusion or contamination and between the various complainants giving evidence could be excluded. And the court of appeals said that this evidence was available. If the jury accepted it and if the jury could safely rule out collusion or contamination, there was no harm in the jury treating the evidence of two complainants as being plus admissible in the sense of supporting each other's complaints. It was argued in court and appeared that it was the goal of the judge to determine whether or not there was collusion or contamination. No said the court of appear, it's not the role of the judge. It's an issue for the jury. If the jury can safely rule out collusion or contamination between these who between these two complainants, then they're entitled to accept their evidence as supportive of each other side. 16, the king on the application of Godwin prior a 2023 high court decision. This was a claim by way of judicial review. It was a challenge against the revocation by DVN A, the Secretary of State Transport of the claimants driving license. That decision was the subject of a statutory appeal by way of complaint to the local magistrate's court. And he duly appealed by way of complaint to the local Magistrates court and the Magistrates dismissed the complaint, the license having been revoked because of disability or perspective disability, such verification is permissible. Looking at section 93 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 an appeal to the magistrate's court upon complaint is permissible under the section 100 of the Act. The application for judicial review was dismissed on the papers by the full court dismissed on the papers and dismissed by the full court. Judicial review is inappropriate. Given the alternative remedies made available by the statutory scheme. Gosh, the high court say that over and over again, don't they, you can't challenge something by way of judicial review in the high court. If you have an alternative remedy. Why? Because judicial review is a discretionary remedy, you must have consent from the High court to pursue your judicial review and you won't get consent if the legislation gives you an alternative remedy. And of course, the legislative scheme does give you an alternative remedy, namely an appear by way of complaint to the magistrate court, you can only go for judicial review, you're only going to get consent to go for judicial review if you have no alternative recourse, no alternative avenue of appeal. 5 17. This was an interesting case. The case of war war A 2023 court of appeal decision, the appellant admitted an offense of failing to surrender to bail as soon as it was reasonably practicable pursuant to section 62 of the bail act 1976. We know, don't we that there were two offenses and they're in the alternative, aren't they? There's one under section 61 and one under section 6261 is failing to surrender at the appointed time and date without a reasonable excuse. 62 being the alternative, having a reasonable excuse for failing to surrender at the appointed time and date did thereafter fail to surrender as soon as was reasonably practicable. And this particular appellant admitted that he fell foul of section 62 because of course, he hadn't surrendered as soon as he possibly could have done. The child was put and he pleaded killed. The defense then submitted that the proceedings could not be continued. As a prosecution representative needed to be appointed, there'd be no prosecutor in court. The recorder disagreed. I said, no, surely we don't need a prosecutor. He's pleaded guilty. It speaks for itself. He should have surrendered as soon as it was reasonably practical and did not do so and accept that by his guilty plea today. And the recorder said I'm going to proceed to sentence the court of appeal agreed with the record and said, no, no prosecutor was required in these circumstances because it was a guilty plea. This was a matter that spoke for itself and there was no need for a prosecutor to be there to outline the facts, the facts spoke for themselves. It would have been different said the court from the, if the peer be not guilty, because in those circumstances, of course, they would have needed to be a prosecutor. Would they not to prosecute the offense? But a prosecutor is not needed on a guilty plea? Also, please do bear in mind of who lays the bailout defenses. It's very simple if it's a failure to surrender at the first hearing, bail having been granted by the police, it is the prosecutor's decision as to whether or not the bailout charges are laid on the file at the same time as the warrant. No bail is applied for. And of course, it's important, the prosecutor makes the application that those charges lay on the file because they are time sensitive. They must be charged within six months and who knows how long it's going to be before this particular person is arrested and brought before the court on the warrant. So it's always a good idea if there's a failure to appear at the first appearance that the prosecutor uh lays or asks effectively for those two bail act offenses to be lay and no doubt the offenses will be put to the defendant as and when he appears in court on the warrant, quite different considerations apply if of course a person attends and then is granted bail by the court and fails to attend on the subsequent hearing bail having been granted by the court in those circumstances. It's not the prosecutor's decision as to whether the bailout charges are laid. But rather, it's the decision of the court. A court invite the prosecutor to lay those charges on the CASI understanding that the prosecutor will prosecute in the event of a not guilty plea being entered. And because this is now a failure to surrender on court bail, this is analogous to a contempt of court and there are no time limits in relation to the lay of those charges. The six month rule doesn't apply if it's a failure to surrender court name side. 18, the claimant sought judicial review of the defendant's decision to adjourn his trial. The defendant was seven. It's Magistrates court, the claimant sort a declaration which of course is one of the provocative bits that you're going for. And if you go for judicial review in the High court, we've got mandatory orders, haven't we? We've got uh declarations um and other orders that can be made by the High court on the facts. The high court agreed and said that the magistrate's decision to adjourn the trial was unlawful because it had been insufficiently reasoned. Right. No further war was made as it was noted that the last decision made by the magistrate magistrate was that the trial should be heard af fresh by a new bench of Magistrates. Didn't quite understand that in the sense of I know the claimant sought a declaration that the decision to adjourn was unlawful, but wouldn't you want something more than merely a declaration didn't seem to take the defense any further. Did he getting that declaration that that adjournment was unlawful? Slide? 19, the matter arrived at the Crown Court by way of an appeal against sentences. The registrar in the court of appeal raised concerns about the lawfulness of the centers that have been passed in Crown Court again. Oh, dear. We're back to irregularities in the committal or sending by the Magistrates to the crown court. We looked at one of these cases earlier, didn't we please please please say the court appear familiarize yourselves with the circumstances in which cases can be committed for sentence from the Magistrates court to the crown court. And circumstances in which matters can be sent from the Magistrates court to the crown Court. Court of Appeal decided the only way to deal with it was to start from scratch by turning themselves into a divisional court of the high court. They then the unlawful committal for sentence. They then I believe sat at the Magistrates court and did it properly. They then sat as a crown court and proceeded to sentence. So sometimes you know the court of appeal, things have happened and they can't really be undone by the Court of appeal Court of appeal has no power to quash things that is a writ that can only be delivered by the high court. But what the court of appeal can do of course is that they can reconstitute themselves as a divisional court of the High Court. And then of course, they're possessed of all the powers of the High court, including the decision to quash any unlawful sending and any unlawful committal for sentence. Let's just have a recap about how it has to work because how it has to work is as follows. If the matter is purely indictable, not a problem, it can be sent section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. If the matter is either way or summary, there's no problem with sending those as well. So long as they are part of the same facts of the indictable offense might have rape, you might have a bh and you might have common assault. Well, if there's a nexus between those three offenses that all of them can be sent section 51 it's very different with committals per sentence, different with committals per sentence. The committals for sentence sections are sections 14 through to 24 of the sentencing Act 2020. I'm sure you don't need me to tell you that committals for sentence only coming to play where there's been a guilty plea or a conviction after a trial, you need a guilty plea or a conviction after a trial. And the classic commit for sentence of course, is of an offense that's tribal either way where the Magistrates just think that their sentencing powers are not sufficient. We know that's a committal for sentence, don't we using section 14 of the sentencing Act 2020? And once you've committed for sentence a matter, that's either way, you can also look around for summary offenses and see whether or not you want to commit those for sentence as well. And you might, well want to, particularly if they're connected with the either way matter which you've just committed for sentence, you might have committed on a dangerous driving, guilty plea. Well, if you've also got guilty pleas to driving whilst disqualified and no insurance, you're going to commit those for sentence as well perfectly permissible to commit the sentence, summary only offenses so long as you've already committed him on a defense that's tribal liable. And of course, it must be pointed out to the sentencing judge that when sentencing summaryon offenses, the duties cap at the maximum sentencing powers available to the Magistrates. In other words, six months, you can't give more than six months. Even if you're dealing with a multiplicity of summary offenses, you capped at six months, you can make the sentences consecutive, but you can't give more than six months. What you can't do is start sending matters for trial and committing summary offenses per sentence. It's just not lawful. See the sentencing Act 2020 slide 20. Another application for judicial review this time of the decision of the Crown Court to proceed in absence and to dismiss an appeal against conviction from the Magistrates court without hearing the evidence. The claimant was not present when the case was called on, he'd contacted, contacted the court and told them that he was running late. He was unrepresented. The court allowed some time for him to turn up. And then the time having passed, they decided to dismiss his appeal. Well, obviously he was not happy with that and took the matter for judicial review to the high court challenging the decision of the Crown Court judge to dismiss. First question me and he were the High Court able to look at the matter answer. Yes, because the High Court can consider decisions made by crown court judges that don't relate to matters on indictments. Remember, we looked at the case earlier in which the High court said, look, don't come to us please. We're not permitted to review the decisions of Crown Court judges relating to matters concerning trials on indictments because this didn't concern a matter concerning a trial on indictment. This was an appeal against conviction from the Magistrates court to the Crown Court. Appeals are not matters on indictment. So there's no problem with challenging such a decision in the high court by way of judicial review. Remember that a matter becomes a matter on indictment essentially because it's been sent from the Magistrates court to the Crown Court section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. So there was no problem with the High Court looking at the judge's decision as being an appeal. The High Court held that the Crown Court did have the power to strike a claimant's case from the list without hearing evidence. However, the High Court went on to say that the court should have further adjourned at least until the afternoon to give the claimant trying to arrive at court. And on the basis that that was a decision, uh which was not arrived at the law. The law we used to believe uh the crown court decision uh was quashed by the high court. So a classic example there of the high court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over courts of inferior jurisdiction, namely crown courts and Magistrates courts do remember that all decisions of Magistrates and all decisions of district judges are susceptible to challenge in the High Court by way of judicial review. But be careful if you're seeking to challenge by way of judicial review, a decision of a crown court judge because you must look carefully at Archbold and decide whether or not this decision related to a matter concerning trials on indictment. And if he did, I'm afraid that decision is not susceptible to challenge by way of judicial review in the high court. For the obvious reason that trials would be necessarily, and proceedings would be necessarily lengthened if the parties in the case were able to keep going to the high court challenging the various decisions of the Crown Court judge. That's the rationale for saying that such decisions are not susceptible to challenge in the High Court by way of judicial review. Well, there you are, we've dealt with those um 20 cases. We've come to the end of the hour. Um I hope you found it uh very interesting as I say. Um do please bear in mind the other uh webinars uh that I've done the data law, I mentioned them at the beginning. Did I not? So all that remains is for me to thank you on behalf of myself and on behalf of data law for watching this particular presentation. And I do look forward to your company again on a um a future uh data law webinar presentation. Uh Just remember criminal legislation 2023 update already done that criminal evidence, a 2023 update already done that advising clients at the police station in 2023 already done that today. Clearly, we've done case law for criminal practitioners. I'm also going to be doing for data law by way of a webinar. The criminal procedure rule was 2020 as amended and the criminal practice directions at 2023 update. Also going to be doing a webinar for them, a offensive weapons, knives, related articles of corrosive substances. A 2023 update also going to be doing a webinar, the billing of criminal E lane, police stations, Magistrates courts, crown court work. So watch out for those webinars appearing on the data law website as well. Thank you.
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