Hello everybody and welcome to today's session through Data law. My name is Safta Mahmoud and today then I'm taking you through the second and final part of this two part session where I'm looking at placement orders, a vacation and Luter pos adoption. So the core principles. So as I mentioned in the first session, this is something that really all practitioners working in this field do need to have an understanding and appreciation of. So I'm taking you through some of the adoption processes and the processes of planning for adoption. So we looked last time at the position with placement orders and the position with parental responsibility and also the position with revocation and later to oppose the making of adoption orders. So in particular that I'm taking you through placement orders, what they are, how they differ then to care orders and freeing orders, which we used to have. I'm taking you through adoption panels and processes. So we looked at matching last time recommending approving, we looked at verification of placement orders. Last time I took you through the developing law and criteria and also spent some time looking through the law and neutral policy the making of the adoption orders today, I'll be developing that in more detail today. By looking at polls, we'll look at placement orders in more detail and also the position revocation of adoption orders. So as to bring you up to speed with the current line of thinking in so far as those matters are concerned, and you can see this is this is an area, therefore, which is particularly relevant for both family and Children law practitioners. And I'm looking at the laws of July 2023. So this is where we need to understand some of the changes that have been brought about in so far as the position with funding and family law cases uh is concerned. So I'm gonna spend a bit of time running through uh some of this with you. And just before I do, I just really wanted to recap on sort of discussions that we had in the first session. So remember a placement order was made under the section 21 of the adoption Children at 2002. It gives that local authority that authorization to place a child for adoption. And we discussed how a placement order differs from a free order that we used to have because with order, the parents lost their pr at the point which was made placement order to pr continues to be held by the parents and it's only lost if and when the child is subsequently adopted. Now, when it comes to a placement order, let's say the child is may subject to a care and placement order. Last time I went through with you, the process of, of then looking to identify families for that child will then go through the matching process and then the child is matched and there's the introductions and then the child is placed with those by adopters. So we talk, spoke about that. Now when that child is placed with those prospective adopters, they at that stage also pick up parental responsibility at that stage. So they pick up parental responsibility. Therefore, it's now shared between the adoption agency, between the parents with pr and also the prospective adopters. But the local authority in its adoption agency will decide the extent to which the prospective doctors and the parents exercise their pr in that regard. And once and if any adoption application is lodged, then that's where I discuss with you the leave to pose application that may well be put in. If the parents are successful in getting pose, then there'll be an adoption hearing thereafter which they may be successful on. And that way the child won't be adopted, but the parents are on won't be adopted by those particular adopters that put the application in. But if the parents are unsuccessful in getting literal polls and you can see a lot of the case law. I looked at last time, the RB case of 2013, the VW case of 2016, if the parents are unsuccessful in getting that leal polls and that's where that president's guidance of 2018 does say that any adoption hearing thereafter must not be listed to be heard for at least 21 days to enable the parent then to seek permission thereafter uh to apply uh to uh indoor circumstances uh lodging appeal, for example. So you can see the purpose behind that in so far as that's concerned. Now, in terms of funding, there have been some changes to the funding regime in so far as adoption is concerned. So this is where uh we've got uh these changes that were brought in uh uh to the legal aid sentencing and punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This was brought in by one of the miscellaneous amendments order of 2000 and 13. And what this basically looks at are some of the changes that we've had to when you're dealing with these types of cases. So we need to be familiar with this and see what the position is as far as as this is concerned. So let me see, let's just go through some of the changes here. This order came into force on the first of March 2023. But in fact, the key provisions that I'm taking you through came in on the first of May 2023. And these provisions are, are these, so as from the first of May 2023 if you're say a child or a family practitioner, then from that date, first of may you now have the availability of non means tested funding that's available to not just parents but also those persons who have pr for the child in cases where there's an application for a special ship order placement order or an adoption order, but these would need to be made outside care proceedings. So what that would mean is, let's say you've got a situation where there is say a freestanding placement application, a child is already made subject to a care order and say the local authority in larger placement application. Thereafter, there is then the availability of non means tested public funding in all circumstances for the parent and other person to P I. In that situation, let's say there is an adoption application. So less than a child has been made subject to a care and placement order and a child has subsequently been placed with the prospective adopters. Remember we said last time that in most cases, the child would have had been living with the prospective doctors for at least 10 weeks before they can apply to uh apply to adopt that child. And let's say you're acting for a parent in that situation. As from the first of May, you can now apply for non means tested funding for that to for example, uh be represented then on the adoption application. So in terms of any application, they seek to apply under section 47 by way of leave to pose. So that's where that provision would then come into place as far as that's concerned. Ok. So this would be relevant on any say, freestanding SG applications such as in a private law case and once and if say care and placement orders have been concluded, if a child has been placed, then uh funding would be available on no means basis then to represent a parents, for example, in those circumstances. Ok. So that's where that provision has come into play. Now, let's look at some of the other case law which looked at which has looked at the position with to oppose the making of uh adoption orders. And this was a case whereby the parents were in fact successful in getting the. So this was a case of why this 2020 decision handed down the leading judgment handed down by Lord Justice Baker. And this is where in fact the local authority appealed against in in adoption proceedings concerning the child who was aged two, they appealed against the order on the basis that the judge at first instance had granted the parents would leave to oppose the making of the adoption order. So like I say, it's the local authority who appealed against uh this uh leave that had been granted. So within those case, ceilings, findings had been made uh against the parents, they had accepted and findings had been made against them that they had inflicted a child with various injuries. And the parents had also within those care proces had found to have lied repeatedly. And like I say, care and placement orders were granted. Now subsequently, the child was placed with prospective doctors and then subsequently, thereafter, uh the uh adopters, prospective doctors then applied to adopt it. In fact, the prospective doctors were the child's foster carers with whom the child had been living with now for some nearly 18 months. So they subsequently then put the application to adopt his child. And uh the so then to have the child matched and then with a view to then subsequently, like I say adopting the child, so they lodged the adoption application and that's where the parents then instructed lawyers where they were seeking permission under section 47 5 for leave and therefore permission to oppose the making of the adoption order. And as you remember in the last session, I did mention that the criteria for this is under section 47 where firstly, you have to show that there has been a change in circumstances since the placement order was made. And secondly, that the child's welfare requires permission to be granted. So those were the two uh elements of the test that needs to be established on the facts. And in fact, the judge at first instance, did grant the parents permission for lateral powers in that regard. And that's where the local authority appealed that leave application, that leave decision that was granted. And the local authority referred to three areas that they said that, that the judge had failed uh in uh being able to come to the right decision. And they said that in three areas, the judge appeared to conclude that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances. Uh that, that is that the judge had been satisfied that the parents' relationship had stabilized, that the father had taken steps to deal with the anger management. And that there had been no further instance of domestic abuse. But the local authority's argument was that in all of these areas, there was insufficient evidence to. So should this change? So, in relation to parents relationship, uh it had been shown that during the care proceedings that shown to deceive professionals about their relationship, local authority relied on evidence to show that this was deceitful relationship. And it was argued that the court could not properly be satisfied, that relationship had stabilized. And therefore, it has really been argued that there was insufficient data to show that there had been that change which the parents have been suggested. There was as for domestic abuse, the local authority was saying there was no evidence to support the assertion that no further instance had occurred. Uh And uh therefore, they said that the judge's analysis was uh uh uh deficient in that regard. And also the judge should have taken into account the fact that the father said he will seek out the child wherever the child was placed. It obviously very strong arguments that the local authority ran. However, the parents took a different stance. You can see here on this slide, the parents took a very different side. They said actually they were a lot more stable in their relationship. They said there was a change in circumstances. Member asked to test that one has to look at. They said we've moved to a better neighborhood. There were no reports of domestic abuse and engagement with mental health services and to a regime of education stricter doing that was such that all of these three factors showed a change in circumstances for the purposes of the first limb of section 47 5. And in fact, the parents said that in reaching the conclusion, the judge was drawing on his long experience on the case. So this was really the best judge to be able to be satisfied as to what those changes were and whether they were sufficient. And as you can see, this is the one big advantage of obviously having judicial continuity because the judge who will have then been involved in these proceedings. Uh throughout its longevity will then know as to whether the judge feels that these changes are such that they are of a material nature. And also there was no independent evidence to support the assertion that there had been no domestic abuse since the end of scenes that didn't prevent the judge from accepting the fact that there was no evidence. So just because there was no independent evidence, it doesn't mean that what the parents were stating uh was, was to be faulted. So, in this regard, what is the test? Well, this is where on appeal, the court said that when assessing whether there's been a change in circumstances, judge is not, of course entitled to si simply accept what the parents have said at face value, they have to carry out their own evaluation and take into account the circumstances, take into account the history and the findings. What about the second link? Well, here it was a two stage approach. So you remember I mentioned that case of V Bs last time where there's a two stage approach. And firstly, you got to show whether or not there's a realistic prospect of being successful and then you gotta look at the impact on the child. Uh if uh leave was granted. And here, the judge said that he was evaluating was not the prospect of a child being returned to the parents' care, but rather the prospect of the parents successfully opposing the making of the adoption order. So it's not that you have to see whether or not this child should. What's the possibility of this child being placed back with parents? But more how likely are they to be able to oppose adoption by the prospective adopters. And if on the facts, it was felt that there was a realistic prospect of that bearing in mind the impact upon the child and the circumstances and the child's welfare being paramount, then that's what you're assessing on the facts. So here on the facts that judge unbalance did say that actually the appeal would be disallowed, not every judge would have given leave in these circumstances. And it didn't follow that this judge was wrong to reach that decision. But given what this judge knew his knowledge and experience of the case and given what he knew about the family relationship, he'd been involved in the process, he was better placed than anyone else to make that welfare evaluation. And if on that basis, uh the court appeal was satisfied that the leave that was granted was appropriate in the circumstances. Ok? It didn't mean of course that just because Lee was granted, it wouldn't mean that the child would not be adopted. Of course, there were strong arguments in favor of adoption. But nonetheless, the leave, the first stage of the process was granted under in the circumstances. Now, staying with that uh the most recent case then which looks at the test for whether or not leave for permission should be granted to oppose the making of the adoption order. The most recent case on this at the moment is the case of re ma child leave to oppose adoption. So this was handed down by the court of appeal uh earlier this year. And one of the things that's been emphasized in this case is one where uh it was the local authority who appealed against the order, which did grant permission for the mother to oppose the adoption application. And Lord Justice Jackson Dany leading judgment and his lordship did say that the essential question for the court when it is deciding on an application for pose to make of the adoption order, is this the essential question that is firstly, has there been a change in circumstances since the placement order was made? So as you know, that's the first part of the limit, isn't it? Has there been a change in circumstances? And therefore, uh this is where as you know, many of you who will be acting for parents in these circumstances will be arguing that yes, there has such as in the cases, we've looked at them, it may be argued that the parent is a lot more stable in their relationship with each other. There may be the absence of the reasons why the placement order was initially made. So you got to satisfy that part first and if you can, then secondly, if taken all the circumstances into account under permanent consideration with a child's long lifelong welfare, should the court revisit the plan for adoption that it approved of making a placement order? Ok. So for those reasons that you're looking at the placement order are such that there has been a change since that and this doesn't have to be a change necessary in relation to parents. This could also be in relation to the child. Of course, it may be that now that the child has got older. Now that the child local authority, for example, or in this situation, a child has been placed, it might be that that placement is, is not actually working. So therefore, it may be that that change in circumstances is such that this child's lifelong welfare does not require or require the court to be satisfied that adoption in this child's welfare best interest. But in practice, you'll find a lot of the situations here would be that the parent may argue that there has been a change in their circumstances such that one has to revisit the plan for adoption uh from the reasons why they approved that plan at the point at which the placement order was initially granted. And in relation to the first part of the test law Justice Jackson did say that the parent is not expected to show that there's been a complete change in circumstances. Ok. So don't have to show a complete change. The court has to look at the overall situation and the fact that some things may have changed, others may not, but that doesn't prevent the court being satisfied that there's been sufficient change. Ok. So very important that point, the other significant aspect that this case has highlighted is is in the position surrounding transcripts. So one of the things this case has highlighted is this in relation to documentation at paragraph seven of the judgment. Uh His lordship has said that when the court is giving its reasons for making a placement order, the court should always order a local authority to obtain a transcript of his judgment unless it's handed down a written version or made arrangements for there to be an agreed and approved not. And this also applies in a case where a final care order was made, although disappear wasn't under. So you can see the significance of that client. If the court does make a care and placement order, then there should be a transcript obtained because if say later on somebody is applying for to revolt the placement order, you need to look at what the basis is upon which your care order is made. So you need that you need that transcript or if somebody is applying for you to oppose the making of the adoption order, again, you need to look at at the um the the judgment to see on what basis that placement order was made. So as to see what changes there have been from when that order was handed down. So obviously a need for the transcript is necessary in those circumstances, staying with documentation. This is where the other case of Rs is very important. So this is Rs Hr is 2021 decision. And this really looks at the position with the annex a report and also other previous documents which may well then be relied upon. Uh and and needs to be looked at when it comes to any application for neutral poll. So this was a case of R had done by the court of appeal in April 2021. Uh leaving judgment by Lord Justice by Kerr. So this is where the mother applied against the application for leave to oppose the making of the adoption order. So uh so she had applied for leave that was refused and she was appealing against that. She was a litigant in person and her child was aged five years of age. And the issue was this, the court said the issue was as to whether the mother had in fact been afforded due process as opposed to the merits of application. So it was more really whether or not the procedural elements have been appropriately dealt with here. And the court did in fact allow the appeal and gave directions for rehearing of mother's application. And uh essentially the case was this. Uh they had been mother had been informed of the application adoption order and she did lodge her application for leave to the polls. She did rely upon a number of changes in her circumstances which were challenged by the local authority uh either on the basis they were saying they were inaccurate or insufficient or they'd been taken over by other matters. So the local authority opposed. But what this case really turned on was this in considering that leave to oppose application, there was a procedural failure. And that's that is because in considering that leave application, the judge had not seen the transcript of the placement proceedings to then see if there had been a requisite change in circumstances since the placement order was made. So you can see this ties in with this decision earlier this year. The case of m that I've mentioned where it's, it's therefore imperative to have a transcript of the placement, please proceedings. So at least the judge knows what to compare what that change of circumstances in to the reasons that were given at the point at which the placement order was made. And therefore the absence of a transcript of the trial judge's judgment leading to making of the placement order for years previously otherwise, and the evidence of the findings meant that any later judge could not know what the baseline was to obviously assess a change in circumstances. And and here that really placed that child in a very that judge in a very difficult position. So local authority had been directed to lodge a bundle for this appeal but had failed to do so. The only documents that were in the index were later documents, despite the judge's order directing that court papers from the previous proceedings be filed. And although the judge did reference to the positive nature. The reports, obviously, there were references to positive elements to reassure the mother. The reality is that uh the report that dealt with the position of the birth family. Uh because mother hadn't seen that the judge hadn't seen that the mother was not really in a position to challenge anything which was being said about her. So that was really part of the difficulties here. And this is where the local authority did say, well, actually these annex a reports in terms of the report on the prospective adopters, it's confidential. The court can of course direct disclosure of that. Uh and um the local authority yes, was right in that any annex a report which is the report that's still under the prospector adopted. It is confidential because it will contain confidential information on the prospector adopters and section A of that will report on the suitability of the adopters to adopt a child. They are confidential. However, the local authority didn't refer the court to the F pr route 14.13 which does enable the court to direct that the report be disclosed to a party proceeding. So in fact, some elements of that report could have been made available to the mother uh in the uh the circumstances. And her ladyship did say that there was no provision in the F pr that requires a party to be notified that an annex a report has been filed but what was emphasized here was family practitioners need to be aware of the necessity imposed upon the local authority. Adoption needs to do so. And we want to uh contact the court to make an appropriate request for inspection. But a litigant in person may not know that they may not appreciate that this documents there's even been filed and and of the information that's available for it. So it's unlikely that the mother had even been aware that there is this document there. So therefore, all legal representatives, the court said do have this positive duty to assist the court in delivery of justice. They are duty to the court to assist in its delivery. And therefore, the local authority had an interest on the part of the child regarding their future and therefore, that should have been dealt with appropriately on the facts. So you can see there are a number of issues here that were raised and although the court did explain to her mother and she confirmed, she understood uh what the position is. The fact is that the court would allow the appeal. It didn't mean of course that she would then successfully oppose the adoption. The judge quite rightly said there were a number of hurdles there. Uh and um successfully opposing the adoption was a very high hurdle, but the matter wouldn't need to be heard again. So they would need to be a rehearing in relation to leave, to oppose. So again, you can see the importance of making sure uh the significance of having the transcript and therefore having the transcript of the placement order, uh the base upon which that was made, so that the judge has enough information there to look at using that as a baseline to see what the changes are and whether those are of a sufficient degree. And secondly, in these literal applications, uh if the judge is relying upon say the N A uh in in its decision at that stage, and of course, one has to then consider as to whether or not uh elements of that should then be made available to us. In this case, the birth parent, so that they, they then have that information there on that basis. So again, you can see the thinking behind that. Now, staying with the position with uh uh compliance with regulations and provisions generally, this is where the other case which was handed down last year and the year before is very important. This is the case in Somerset. So this is Somerset Council and NHS Clinical Group. And another, this was first handed down by Mrs Justice Roberts uh on the 10th of November 2021. And what this case looked at was the fact that the local authority here, they were applying for declaratory relief under the part 18 of the family procedure. It was in, in relation to seeking relief uh surrounding the lawfulness of placement orders over a period of four years, in respect of a group of uh 10 Children. So we're looking at that in terms of the lawfulness of that order in those circumstances, over a period of that time. And the thinking behind this was because what happened was there were placement orders made in the past as well as adoption orders. So each of these Children were made subject to care and placement orders, they had been placed with prospective doctors. In fact, some placements had now materialized as adoptive placements. And the issue was that subsequent to that, it had been found that the local authority in its role as an adoption agency had failed to comply with certain aspects of its statutory duties under the adoption agency regulations of 2005. And the lo the court was concerned that because the local authority had failed in some of his duties, does it, did it mean that those placement orders that were made were defective? Did it meant that those adoption orders that were made were defective? And therefore, does one have to re look, we look at whether or not those orders should remain and you can imagine therefore, the devastation and the uh upset uh and uh the turbulent um significance that would have on the families if that in fact was going to be the case. Now, this is where the local authority did accept liability for the failings. Uh There were various concessions made for example, it was accepted, that was a, there was a breach of article 15 of the, um, the adoption agency regulations and that's the provision which requires the adoption agency to make arrangements for the child to be examined by a doctor. So it was accepted that, that had, they hadn't complied to that. And it's not that the local authority hadn't done that examination at all. What they were relying upon was the fact that when the child was receiving the care, there's a receiving in care looked after health assessment that was done, but there wasn't a specific one done in relation to looking at proposals for that child to be placed for adoption. So there wasn't that particular provision done and they failed to obtain for the doctor written health report or obtained advice that that assessment was unnecessary. There was also a breach of article 17, which was, there was the failure to obtain a written summary written by the agency's uh medical advisors to child's health uh or confirmation. I heard that that was such that the child hadn't been, didn't have a medical one, they were sufficiently competent to refuse to want that. So it appeared therefore that in some cases, a fully updated Charles Pers report may have only been prepared at the point when placement proceedings were issued. Uh not at the point at which the paperwork was being provided to the agency decision maker to invite him or her to decide whether or not an option was uh to uh to, to be pursued or not. So basically the AD M the agency decision maker wasn't being given all the information that they required as per the adoption agent anxiety. There wasn't the summary provided for in the CPR, there wasn't the uh the uh the uh adoption uh health assessment done and therefore that really brought into play whether or not uh the subsequent placement orders and adoption orders would then stand. And this is where the court did say that even though the court was already dealing with certain Children at this stage, it was the case that there may well have been failures in relation to other Children as well in this regard. So this is where with that in mind, uh the case, obviously, because of the significance was then going to have to be transferred further to the president of the family division. So, so sir Andrew Macfarlane, uh had this judgment uh which was handed down in April last year. So 13th of April 2022 and his lordship uh gave certainly a significant judgment which obviously going forward was, was very, very important. Indeed. And this is where his lordship said that the local authority had applied in the part 18 of the F pr seeking a declaration that the placement order for each child was lawfully made. And Mr Justice Roberts granted those declarations. But the question was, should these declarations even be made or they're necessary. And in fact, his lordship said that's a matter of law. Uh The decision was such that the application for declarations or the question as the validity of the placement orders, adoption orders was neither appropriate nor required on the facts. And in fact, the declarations that were being sought by the local authority were simply dismissed. And this is because uh his lordship said that there was no basis for the local authorities to issue some applications in these circumstances. And the basis for this was this, his lordship said that we do have to go back to basics as to what the criteria are for the court decided to make a placement to an adoption order. And of course, as as we've discussed in making a placement order, one looks at section 21. So there is a child subject to a care order or the threshold criteria under the section 31 2 on that. So you got to be looking at that, you've then got to be looking at uh the consent is the consent of the parent period or the legal guardian provided and they have not withdrawn or are you looking at seeking to dispense with parental consent under the section 52? And that could be on the basis that the child doesn't have a parent or guardian, they may have been abandoned. Uh The parent may have been, may be deceased uh or the parent is incapable of giving consent. The parent may not have capacity to make that decision or the child's welfare requires a consent to be suspended with under section 52 1 B. So those are the requirements for making a placement order and, and some of the requirements for an adoption order. Nowhere in that test does it require for the court to be satisfied that actually, uh the local authority have complied with their duties under the Adoption Agency Act 2005. So there's nowhere that says a breach of the adoption agency automatic requirements makes that placement order void. Then there's provisions for revocation of placement orders. We've got section 24 and that's where one has to show change in circumstances. And secondly, that the child's welfare requires leave to be granted. And as we've discussed in the last session, the test for leaving for seeking leave to revolt, the placement order is change in circumstances and welfare. The decision and that what a decision said that the prospects of success uh have have to be realistic. And the shire uh has been approved in later cases such as VC in the 2020 decision in that regard. So what's the chance realistically of the placement and adoption orders being satisfied? And his lordship did say that when an adoption order, when adoption has taken place, the authorities indicate that it would be in only exceptional circumstances that an existing adoption order would be satisfied. It's very difficult, if not impossible. His lordship said to contemplate circumstances relating to where there's a concern as to a child's health, which was not known to the court when the adoption order is made being of sufficient weight to meet that very high test. But nonetheless, his lordship has said that there is still widespread ignorance and non-compliance with the adoption of regs. And therefore his lordship has said that each local authority as a result of this case had to of course review its own processes and make sure that this process is then appropriately dealt with that going forward. So you can see the significance of that decision in that regard. Now, as I mentioned, revocation of adoption orders is is very exceptional. So you won't get this in many cases at all. There's this case of ht against a local authority and I A this 2021 decision and this was the mother who applied uh to revoke the adoption orders made in respect of the uh three Children. All three Children had been made subject to care and placement orders. Uh An adoption application was lodged. A mother later parents would later applied for leave to oppose the making of adult adoption orders. And the court in fact dismissed the applications for leave to and then the adoption hearing was listed to be heard on the sixth of April 2020. My mother was given notice of that hearing and at that stage as you remember we were in week two of the first lockdown as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. And this is where the mother by email through her solicitor sought an adjournment uh to allow more time for placement applications abroad. Her application was uh had been refused. Now what happened is on the first of April, the adoption social worker sent her texting mother informing her that due to the COVID outbreak, the hearing would be by telephone. But then the same day, that same afternoon, a couple of hours later, the social worker said actually the judge has dealt with the um the adoption hearing and the judge has excused all parties from attending the hearing. So there've been no telephone hearing and that's where mother appealed. So effectively, what happened is at that hearing on the sixth of April, the court had made an order in private uh uh where there'd be no tenants caught by the adoption of the birth parents due to the COVID-19 virus. And uh this is where the mother appealed now to be fair. She had already had her permission hearing to oppose the making of the adoption order and the adoption rooms. Uh do say that even though parents need to be notified of the adoption hearing, they are not entitled to rerun the application for leave to oppose. Nonetheless, she did appeal to the court appeal on the basis that she should have at least been still allowed to attend that hearing and, and the question was really whether or not she would succeed in that regard. So she appealed against that. And she said that there had been a procedural failure here. She claimed there was a failure to hold a full hearing. And that was in breach of article six of the European uh of the European Convention on human rights in terms of not having that right to a fair trial. So mother was running that argument and in fact, when one then looked at the circumstances on appeal, his lordship said that actually her mother's right uh under the F pr uh route 14.3 mother was a party to adoption application and therefore she's entitled to notice under the F pr and 14.15. So actually she was right on that and she is in fact entitled to attend some under the F pr route 14.16 sub paragraph one, she's entitled to attend that hearing. But because her application had already been refused, ie she had already applied for lateral polls, even though she was entitled to attend a hearing that took place on the sixth of April 2020. She would not be entitled to be heard on the question of whether an adoption order should be made or not. Ok. So therefore, you do need to ask yourself well, if she's allowed to attend that hearing, but she's not allowed to rerun her case. Then what's the purpose of her attendance. Well, this is where the court did say the requirement to be given notice is mandatory. In fact, there was reference to the President's guidance paragraph 10 of the President's guidance about listing final hearings and adoption cases of 2018. And it does emphasize there as does the family, as do the family procedure rules were 14.15 that giving notice is mandatory and that any person who's been given notice has the right to, to attend that hearing. And except where we 14.16 sub paragraph two applies ie where they've already had their leave to oppose her and being refused. If that's not the case, they are entitled to attend that hearing and be heard on the question of whether an adoption order should or should not be made in the circumstances. So, in fact, mother was entitled to attend that hearing in the circumstances, but nonetheless, did it attend, did it amount to a fundamental breach of natural justice? And here, even though there was that failure and which the court accepted, um, the judge did say on appeal that that irregularity did not amount to a fundamental breach of natural justice as to give the high court this discretion under the jurisdiction to revoke the orders. And that's because, and the key part of this judgment I would suggest is because um mother did not have permission to oppose the adoption ie even though she was allowed to attend that hearing and she should have been, the judge should not have dealt with the hearing the way the judge did. There was nothing actually she could do to prevent the adoption from happening. So, even though yes, there was a failure and she should have been given notice of the circumstances. It wasn't of a degree uh to uh to say that there was a fundamental breach of natural justice in that regard. And therefore, paragraph 27 of the judgment, uh His lordship said that the better course would have been for the mother to really file notes of appeal, seeking permission to appeal within the time prescribed rather than really bringing this application to later date on how jurisdiction. OK. And one of the things this case emphasizes is if a parent does, for example, wish to uh apply to set aside an adoption order, they should speedily be really bringing that appeal in this circumstance that should have been done sooner rather than later. OK. So you can see a very, very significant decision but again, which highlights the importance of uh making sure that when we are dealing with these cases, we are complying with the procedural expectations that are placed upon uh not just the court but indeed also upon local authorities and adoption agencies in this regard. Ok. So therefore, was a judge to decision to proceed without a hearing, did a man to failure in that regard? It didn't meet the high hurdle of breach of natural justice to justify the court revoking the order and therefore the appeal sadly for mother was dismissed. Ok. So there we are. So you can see, I've covered a number of issues today, looking at some of the other developments in so far as a position with revocation would lead to oppose adoption and also revocation of adoption orders. I hope these two sessions have been used for four year in terms of really putting together some of the current thinking in this area and then bringing you up to speed with where we currently are in this field. And I thank you very much indeed for listening and I look forward to speaking to you next time. Thanks very much. Indeed. Bye for now.
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