Hello and welcome everybody. My name's after my mood distances session to where I'm looking at the position surrounding placement orders, revocation of placement orders, leave to oppose adoption and also the running of adoption panels. So as you know that in these two sessions I'm going through with you. The aim is to give you a fairly comprehensive grounding on the matters related to adoption agencies, running of adoption agencies in terms of the regulations positions running lead to oppose the making of adoption orders, leave to revolt placement orders uh and also the role of panels parallel planning and how this all fits together in the previous session. You remember I spent a fair bit of time going through with you the role of adoption panels, the role of the agency decision maker. I spoke to you about the adoption Children Acts, all the changes that came in as a consequence of that act. The concept of parallel planning the changes brought about by the act in terms of section one, the various principles there. The adoption Children act in terms of the welfare check list in particular. And then we spent some time looking at the position with duties in relation to family members and also take you took you through the law and particularly case law surrounding leave to revoke placement orders and also leave to oppose the making of adoption orders. What I'm going to be doing today than these continuing that theme by looking at some of the more recent case law surrounding leave to oppose the making of adoption orders in particular and also looking at some recent case law authority surrounding the consequence of breaching various regulations or parts of the regulations of the adoption agencies and what the impact of that is. And also recent authorities surrounding applications for uh applying to revoke adoption orders themselves or else I'll take you through some of that today. And I'm looking at law as of August 2022. Now, this is where that I wanted to pick up this case of re y re y leave to oppose adoption. This 2020 decision leading judgment handed down by Lord Justice baker. And this is a case whereby in fact it was the local authority who applied against appealed rather against the order that had been made by the first instance judge, whereby the judge had actually given the parents here leave to oppose the making of the adoption order, pursuant to section 47 of the A. C. A 2002. And as you can imagine, when I looked at the first session with you, you remember, I took you through cases such as we be, we B. S. Re W the 2016 decision and many of those cases, as you know, have shown that even though the court may be prepared to be satisfied that the first limb of the test and the section 47 is met, i. E. That there is a change in circumstances is the second part of the test, which is always very difficult one, and whereby the courts have been very reluctant to be satisfied at that second part of the test is actually and has actually been met. So, in the BBS for example, you remember the 2013 decision where the mother had demonstrated that there had been changed to bring into play. Then uh the changes in so far as changing circumstances for the first part of lim is the second part of the test that she struggled with, whereby the judge did not feel that the welfare of the child was such that leave should be granted on the basis that the prospects of success were not there and the welfare of the child did not require leave to be granted. Well, this case that I'm looking at now, this case of the widest 2020 decision is one where actually the judge did feel that both parts of section 47 were met. There was a change in circumstances since the placement orders were made and the child's welfare was such, that it required leave to be granted. Now, this is one where within the care proceedings, findings have been made. In the course of those proceedings, the parents have accepted the injuries that had been inflicted, that that had that charter suffered. The parents have accepted that they had inflicted the injuries. So findings have been made against them and also have been found that the parents have been found to have lied repeatedly in those proceedings. So, caring placement orders had been made and the child was subsequently placed for adoption. The child had been with the perspective doctors for some 18 months. So you can see this is somewhat similar to the case of www dot I mentioned the 2016 quarter appeal decision and therefore if one does then put in an application for leave to oppose the making of an adoption order, you do then have to look at the relationship with the child has built over the prospective adopters and the impact of the child upon the child of then uh that that child and ceasing to be and remain a member of that family and therefore being returned to the care of their family in that regard. So this child had been living with perspective adoptive foster carers for some nearly 18 months and a subsequent indicated their wish to adopt the child. And so and to have to follow the process of matching being matched with the child. So effectively changing their status from one of foster carers to one of adopters for the child in that regard. And later prospective adopters then filed an adoption application And so the child had been living with foster care in the 18 months they applied the indicator wish to adopt him and to follow the process of matching and prospective adopters like say filed an adoption application and that's where the parents were notified. So they then filed their application for leave to polls section 47. Subsection five. And the court did grant the application for leader oppose. And this was the appeal in relation to that. And what were the grounds for appeal? Because that then helps to understand why uh the the cordon had in fact initially made the order in the first instance forgiving we propose, well this is what the local authority said in their grounds of appeal, they said that there were three areas where the judge appeared to conclude that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances. Firstly the pair's relationship had stabilized. Secondly, the father had taken steps to deal with his anger management. Thirdly, there had been no further instance of domestic abuse. Obviously three very important aspects there. But the local authorities said that yes, although this was changed, none of these amounted to sufficient change to warrant the exercise of the discretion to be satisfied that the first part of the limb was met. They said that regarding the pair's relationship, the court had found in the cape ceilings that they had been deceived for they had deceived professionals and the local authority had relied upon deceitful behavior and they argued that it had continued and therefore judge should not have been satisfied that the relationship had become more stabilized. It was still uh subject to really ongoing deceit and dishonesty on the part of the parents in that regard. Furthermore, the local authority said that as for the domestic abuse, where the parents were saying that there were no further instance of domestic abuse, the local authority said actually there was no evidence to support that session told that there had been no further instance that had occurred in that regard. And in looking at the feasibility of ongoing contact, the judge should have taken to account the statements by the father that he would in fact seek out the child wherever the child was placed. So if the father was not successful in his leave to oppose, the father was already indicating that he would seek the child where the child is placed. So that demonstrated a potential uh potentially causing disruption to the placement and therefore that wasn't in the child's welfare best interests. The parents however took a different view and they submitted on appeal this, they said that actually their relationship had stabilized, which managed to change of circumstances then and move to a better neighborhood. There were no reports of domestic abuse and parents had continued to engage with mental health services and there was a strict regime of education. Now, the judge had in fact reached this decision based on his long experience of the case of the judge. He said that he had dealt with the case, He knew the parents very well, bearing in mind the long longevity of having had worked on this case and worked in the various actually dealt with variously hearing. So the judge said that he was best placed to understand the changes which were necessary and then to really evaluate as to whether or not those were material or not. And yes, there was no independent evidence to support the parents assertion that there's been no domestic abuse since the end of the Cape scenes, but that didn't prevent the judge from accepting the assertion that nothing at this stage had been put forward to suggest that there was domestic abuse and therefore there was no reason to suggest that the domestic abuse was therefore continuing. And the court did say that uh When look and therefore whether or not there has been a change in circumstances for the pursuit of Section 47. His lordship said that when you're assessing that whether there's been sufficient change, the judge uh must not of course just accept the parents assertions of a change at face value. You are required of course to carry out the evaluation of those assertions in light of the circumstances, you need to look at the history, you need to look at the findings in the previous care proceedings which were made, which were obviously highly relevant here. And the court did say that insofar, as the second limit the test, even though the first was met, the judge that needs to be satisfied that there was a real prospect of success and the evaluation wasn't the prospect of the child necessarily being returned to the parents care, but rather were the parents likely to be successful in successfully opposing the making of the adoption order by uh in relation to the application by doors prospective adopters. So the test isn't, how likely are the is the child to be reunited into the care of the parents? But more how likely are the parents to oppose the making of the adoption order given the potential application And here the court did say that given what was known and the fact that the judge had been involved with the proceedings for some time here. The judge felt that given his analysis of the case and what was known of the parents and the change that they made, he was satisfied that there had been that requisite level of sufficient change then enabled the parents to be able to show that there was the child's welfare best interests for such leave should be granted. But the judge did say that not every other judge would have given leave in these circumstances, but he did not follow that the judge would be wrong to reach this decision on the facts. And like I said, given the experience and the knowledge this judge judge had the case, he was better placed than anybody else to make that evaluation and therefore the court appeal not prepared to go beyond that judicial discretion on the basis. This wasn't a decision that was wrong and therefore the court appeal did in fact dismissed the appeal lodged by the local authorities. The court did say have just because leave proposals granted. It doesn't mean of course that the parents would not be successful in successfully opposing the making of the adoption order. Of course this was only the first part of the test but nonetheless obviously very significant part of that. So it's important to bear that in mind as well. Now there's this other case of re F. S. A child placement or the 2021 are very very useful case again, which looks at the position surrounding appealing against plan for adoption. And this case really highlights the importance of ensuring that one carries out a global holistic evaluation and clearly looks at all realistic options appropriately. So this is one where the mother appealed against a plan for adoption. So this is one where uh placement order was made in relation to a child who is now approaching six years of age and the child had global development delay look was uncertain and it was accepted that the child would require a high level of consistent parenting. It was unclear what the child would be able to live independently as an adult. And the judge had made a placement order with a view to open adoption by the foster carers. And this is one where the mother appealed against the planned for adoption. And therefore the question was really whether the judge was wrong in terms of coming to the planned for adoption and if we're making a placement order. So how did the judge then come to that decision first and foremost in in her judgment, the judge did say that adoption was a very extreme thing. The last resorts obviously making reference to re B 2013 decision. And the judge also went on to say that placement orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances where the court is motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare and therefore when nothing else will do when no other course is possible in the child's interest. So again, you can see that this very much ties in with the expectations as laid out in VB as we said, we're when plans for adoption are being pursued obviously uh it's it's a very draconian order and only where it's exceptional and only where nothing else will do and all else fails. So again, you can see the judge didn't make reference to that in the judgment and also relationship did say in coming to a decision that BBS emphasized that there must be proper evidence from both the local authority and the guardian. It must address all the options which are realistically possible and it must really look at the arguments for and against each option. So that needed to be this global holistic evaluation by the court evaluating all these options and therefore taking into account all the negatives and the positives of each. So again, you can see there was emphasis here in relation to re B. S. Being applicable here and then when it does come to dispensing with parental consent to and placement order that may be made on the section of 50 to 1 B. If that's the grand that was going to be used, then the welfare of a child is such that the conceptual dispense. But but it's not where it's desired or its preferred. It's where the welfare of a child requires it, it requires the consent of the parents to be dispensed with. So the judge also referred to that element. Also now in terms of the balancing exercise, the court did say that the judge did in fact set out her welfare analysis in respect of each of the Children should consider the statutory well for checklist, not just under the Children act of 89 but also the welfare check list under the adoption of Children act 2002. So the judge considered both which they need to do uh and the judge ruled out placement with the maternal grandmother on the basis that the child's welfare best interests would be met by living long term would be best met by uh being placed in adoptive placement. And the judge did come up with a view that the only realistic option for the child was one on the one hand being long term foster care with a view to a special partnership board in the future. On the other hand, one of adoptions adjudged and weighed up and did a balance sheet approach of the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Now this is where the mother then logically appeal. And she claimed that the making of replacement orders wrong in law for three reasons. And firstly the mother argued that were the local authority on in contemplated placement of current foster carers who were prepared to continue to care for the child without a replacement order. That it was unreasonable to conclude that placement or parental consensus, almost the mother was arguing that the local authority were too much persuaded by the views of the foster carers in this regard and therefore there was over reliance placed upon their view. Uh And also the mother argued that the judge was wrong and applying the wrong test in that the judge said that one has to look at what would best meet the Charles needs was really what the mother was arguing that the test should have been why no one of course as possible. So it's not what's best for the child's needs, but why no one of course is possible, why adoption was the last resort nothing else will do. And mother, they've argued that there was insufficient evidence on the facts to demonstrate the placement order had in fact been required in terms of the child having developmental delay potentially affecting the child later on in life. Mother argued that this was merely speculative. She said that this was a speculative and therefore this in itself was not a reason to make the the the order to plan for adoption. So the extent to which the child's development of delay would affect the child later in life was speculative. And if this was to be relied upon to show that the child would have lifelong needs that could only be made for the adoption and they need to be greater clarity as far as expert evidence is concerned. And if that became necessary then a placement order could in fact be sought in the future. And the court. The mother also argued that the great stability offered by adoption was not relevant in this case. The court didn't doubt what the foster carers could do it in terms of commitment to a child irrespective of whether replacement order is needed or not. And the court, the mother also said that it was right that adoption would mean that the child would cease to be looked after child. But that wasn't in itself a reason to justify a plan for adoption. What did the court decide when the court in fact went against what mothers arguments were? They said. In fact the judge did apply the correct test. The judge did in fact go through the analysis the ebs analysis appropriately and in fact if the judge had compared the options I. E. Foster care with potentially this G versus adoption as like for like then it would have been a number of approaches the judge had compared like for like but here the court in fact said that the judge applied the correct test. She had accepted the evidence of the guardian who had advised that there was no other another option that would meet the Charles needs of an adoption. And in fact the judge specifically directed herself that planned for adoption could only be approved if it was necessary. So for example she said that the placement all should only be made when nothing else will do. So actually the judge had actually referred to that in her judgment. It's not that she compared the options like for like in that regard and the reasons given were adequate. In fact on the facts. The judge in fact meticulously assessed both the advantages and disadvantages of the competing options and did actually weigh these up and saw that adoption was in fact the prevailing option in the circumstances and therefore one that would meet and served to meet discharge welfare best interests in those circumstances. As for the position with the views of the carers then of course their views are not determinative and decisive but they are relevant. So his lordship dictate a view that the fact that child's future carers wanted to adopt him wasn't decisive of course. But it is relevant to welfare and the judge was entitled to take that into account and give that some weight had the carers not wanting to adopt that would have been relevant. And if they were only prepared to carefully adopted child and that would also be relevant. So obviously that's a factor that is considered. But the assessment by the court cannot be dictated. Although it may be influenced of course, by the attitudes of individuals. Which is what the position was here. What about the position with the child's development or delay? Was that factor? And the court actually said yes, the court was entitled, The judge was entitled to take into account that given the child's developmental delay, difficult, start in life than the best possible form of parenting should be available. And adoption could potentially provide more longer term permanent placement in that regard. And therefore that was a factor which couldn't was take into account what the mother was misguided into believing that adoption did not provide greater stability here. We can and therefore that was of critical importance on the facts here. And as for special guardianship. Yes, that is an option. But the fact is that special guardianship is reversible. Yes, it does give a high degree of commitment, but it wasn't irreversible adoption of course, is not irreversible, but only exceptionally. Can you revoke adoption orders? And if a Special Garden reporter was made, it would require further litigation to establish it made lead to further litigation in the future here on the facts. Mother was likely to make further application in the future. She had already sold the seeds of potentially disrupting the placement in the future. And therefore special garden ship was considered as an option. Then that would really open up the doorway for opening up more uh litigation in the future. And there was a real possibility that mother would disrupt the placement. She wanted a child and sibling returned before her and she on the facts had in fact immediately tried to challenge the placement order in respect of the other siblings. So the seeds of potential disruption were already there and therefore the need for therefore stability and permanency by way of an order which would be less likely to be challenged or capable of being challenged in the future. And hence adoption. And also the court said that the significance of open adoption was relevant. It was significant that open adoption was hoped for. The child's relationship with mother and siblings was important and there was obviously the opportunity for this to be preserved. But whether or not they were going there was going to be a contact order. When the adoption order was made i. e. section 51 a order would be a matter for the court at that time and a lot would then depend on mother's attitude to adoption at that stage. So significance of our adoption was obviously an issue which would then be taken into account or so on the facts. Despite mother appealing against the making of the placement order, she was unsuccessful on the facts. So the judge had in fact explained why less order was inappropriate and not good enough and therefore the judge was fully entitled on the facts to make a placement for mother's appeal was in fact dismissed. Okay so difficult decision. But you can see the thinking behind that now that then ties in with what I mentioned earlier, in terms of the position uh with uh the compliance with the adoption agencies regulations. So you remember in the first session, I did go through with you in some detail the position surrounding the adoption agencies regulations sort of fact that local authorities must ensure that they comply with the regulations. We spoke earlier about the position with the child's Permanence report, for example, the need for making sure that that's made available and also what the contents of that are and that really forms the basis Uh this decision in Somerset Council and others back in November last year 2021. And then more recently uh the appeal in relation to this in April 2022. So this was a case handed down by mrs Justice Roberts and the case involved at the local authority who had applied for decorative relief and the part 18 of the family procedure rules whereby they were seeking uh confirmation as to the lawfulness of placement orders which had been made in respect of several Children over a period of years and essentially what this case turned on was that these particular Children. this cohort of Children had been made subject to care and placement orders and had been placed in perspective adoptive placements and there had been other Children who had already been placed in adoptive placements. There was some Children who had already been adopted and the question was, which had been raised in this case was the issue in relation to the lawfulness of the placement orders that had been made, Given that it had been found some months previously. That in its in the local authority, in its role in the adoption agency had failed to comply with certain aspects of its statutory duties under the adoption agency regulations of 2005 is amended. So the court was very concerned as the implications of the local authorities failings which they had accepted and if the local authority had failed to comply the various aspects of the regulations, did it then mean that those placement orders that have been made that had been made going forward, and indeed even adoption orders that have been made going forward on those cases with the local authorities would not comply with the adoption agencies regulations, Were those then orders obsolete with non void and therefore, what kind of an impact would that then have going forward? Not just for this particular authority, but also other local authorities who may have been in the same positions? Obviously this was a major major issue that needed addressing and the court was concerned that some Children had already been adopted. And therefore like concerns have been raised over the legality of those placements. Uh And if placements orders for example have no legal effect because the adoption agencies rex had not been fully complied with, would that mean that the whole process has to be gone through again, for example. So these were very very difficult questions that needed determining and answers to. Well firstly then the local authority did accept its liability for the failings. So that's the first thing that in fact they did say that there had been failings in terms of compliance of the adoption agencies regulations and the adoption agencies regulations, you know, are the 2005 as amended and they're accompanied by the statutory guidance issued by the Dfe, which is still one of July 2013 or there was a draft version provided in 2014 which has not been finalized and there are various aspects of the adoption agencies regulations which were considered in this particular case. Regulation seven, which relates to structure uh placements regulations 15 and 17 in particular. So therefore on the facts of this case, Regulation 15 provides that the adoption agency must insofar as is reasonably practicable uh ensure that subject to the adoption agency saying otherwise they need to be making arrangements for a child to be examined by registered medical practitioner. And secondly they need to be obtaining from the practitioner written report or the child's health report on the state of the child's health and unless they received unless the agency has received advice from Medical Advisor that this assessment and report is unnecessary. Now that's the first part, that was basically article Article 15 of the regulations which basically said that there was a breach of article 15 and failing to make arrangements for each child to be examined by the doctor. So that was the first element because that hadn't been done and secondly failing to obtain from that doctor written health report alternatively, to obtain advice from them that such an examination report had been unnecessary. There was also the reference to article 17 which then requires a report to be provided. Uh the written report as I mentioned, the CpR which needs to include a summary written by the medical advice of the state of the child's health, the health history and any health care which may rise. So what was happening in this case and in some of the cases was that the social worker had been preparing the trans permanence report. And even though they did have the child's health assessment. And even though the CpR did contain a summary written by the medical advisor of the State of Child's Health, this was only being made available and therefore fully updated Charles permits in medical was permanent reports being made available, but at the point at which the placement seems were being issued. So therefore not at the point at which the ADM agency decision maker had been asked to decide whether or not to recommend that adoption was in this child's welfare best interest and that was the issue really. So even though this information was subsequently being made available, it was being made available later than when it should have been. And that was really one of the major concerns in this case and also failing to make a direct request of the agency medical advisor to determine the necessity of or need for a child to be examined with the preparation of the health report. So that was a major issue and therefore leadership Did say that this is where the part 18 applications were therefore being lodged. So as to then invite the court to then give a view as to the lawfulness of these adoption order, these placement orders and subsequent adoption orders that are being made. And the court did say that even though they were dealing with only 10 of the cohort Children of course this was something that therefore potentially would then have a huge impact on other Children who had been made subject placement toward us and indeed who had been adopted, not just for this local authority, but going forward across other local authorities across England and Wales. And this is where then therefore this needed consideration by a um a more senior court on this issue and potentially in terms of regulation and consideration going forward and this is where Uh the matter was looked at by the president of the family division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, the president. And the judgment was handed down on 13 April this year. So this is where the local authority had applied in the part 18 of the FPR whereby they were then seeking this declaration seeking for replacement orders that have been made in respect of two Children to be regarded as being lawfully made uh And therefore for confirmation. And that was the case with muted and of course being the position and for other cases as well. And his lordship took this view, his lordship said that actually as a matter of law, the decision Uh the applications of the part 18 applications at the local authority had lodged were not necessary. And in fact the applications would be dismissed. And in fact, his lordship did say that decision that an application a declaration that the validity of the existing placement orders and indeed care orders was neither appropriate nor in fact even required on the facts, his lordship said that there was actually no legal basis For other local authorities adoption agencies to even issue similar applications with respect to breaches on the medical requirements that may have been discovered in cases where placement orders and adoption of orders had already been made in these circumstances. And what was the thinking behind that? Well, essentially what his lordship was saying is his lordship was dismissed apart 18 applications on this basis when you look at the validity of the placement orders of adoption orders, one had to bear in mind that all court orders are valid and enforceable until of course the court sets them aside. And here there was no need for the application was made on the part 18 seeking a declaration that these orders were valued because they were valid that had been made unless a court sets them aside on the basis that they uh not valid. Well, how can you set them aside have vulnerable to challenge with his lordship? Said that there is a distinction between the local authority and its decision as an adoption agency to apply for a placement order. To place the childhood perspective adopters which may be defective if for example, have breached any of the elements of the adoption agencies. So that's one thing. But that's different to any subsequent decision by the court who then goes on and grants the placement order or the adoption order. So, the fact that the former decision by the local authority may be defective in the way they comply with that because they didn't comply with the adoption 80s regulations. That doesn't mean that late decision by the court is then effective. So the former decision by the local authority may of course be a target for challenge by judicial review, but the latter decision by the court is not and that's because the court did say that this is the so called constitutional theory of the second Actor principle, which basically means that the theory provides that any unlawfulness by First Actor may invalidate their own acts, but we're not directly invalidate the act of a second Actor. So here putting it like that if the acts of the local authority were defective because they haven't complied to the adoption agencies regulations, that doesn't invalidate the actions of the Second Actor, local authorities decided to make the placement orders or the adoption orders and therefore you need to look at what the criteria are for the making of care for the making of placement towards us and adoption orders. And His lordship said. That follows that placement order, adoption order made in circumstances where there has been a breach of the adoption agency regulations by the adoption agency is not in consequence void. So how can you then uh invalidate the replacement order? Well, by applying for it to be revoked. But as we've seen in the last session, you'll remember when I took you through the law, unless you remember that revolting placement order is through section 24 of the act and that is the Charles uh team may apply, the child may apply the relevant local authorities may apply other people may apply with leave to what it's your case that I mentioned earlier, but you may only apply, would leave if if if of course you do get leave and there's a two pronged test, you gotta show firstly that there's been a change in circumstances since the placement orders made. And secondly, that the welfare of the child requires me to be granted. And that's based on showing a prospect of success. And the child's welfare is not power but a relevant consideration. So, as mentioned previously, leave to apply to evoke will only be granted if there has been a change in circumstances and the court considers leave should be granted. And one has to therefore look at the prospects and the welfare of a child in deciding that. And that's where the Warwickshire case, as I mentioned, is the author authorization for that. And his lordship said that would be very difficult to contemplate a case where concern over the child's health was sufficiently serious to justify reopening the placement order by permitting an application of verification to proceed yet. The health issue is a non support at the time that the place was made so. But of course, if on the facts, the health issue does become apparent and the child has not yet been placed for adoption, that it is open for a parent. Of course, all those acting for the child to apply for lead to apply to revoke or the local authority to do so without seeking leave in those circumstances. So that possibility was of course, there. And what about the fact that all the papers were not given to the ADM when they should have been when his lordship said that maybe suggested that any placement orders which were made where there has been earlier noncompliance will remain susceptible to change and may result in any agency decision may have been flawed. Uh But in fact, the court did say that we do have to go back to the only grounds that are available for revoking a placement order and for revoking an adoption order. And when it comes to adoption. Of course, there are only very limited circumstances when adoption order will be revoked. Only exceptionally, such as what was identified in the Webster Norfolk can't cancel case. And even there following new information that had become available at the time at which the adoption orders were made. Even that result in the court exceptionally revolting replacement orders. The circumstances in which adoption orders will be revolt are highly exceptional and therefore the chance of existing placement and adoption orders being set aside were such that it was difficult, if not impossible. His lordship said to contemplate circumstances relating to a child's health which were not known to the court when the adoption orders were made being sufficient weight to meet that very high test. Nonetheless, his lordship did say that there was still widespread ignorance and non compliance with the requirements and adoption agencies regulations. And this is where local authorities do need to review their own procedures going forward to make sure that there is a deer and some compliance with the procedures going forward. So obviously it's a very important case, but one that at least has addressed significantly the issue surrounding noncompliance with various aspects of the adoption agencies regulations. Now, the last case that I wanted to discuss with you today is this case of H. T. And a local authority and it's a very useful case which really emphasizes how difficult it is to be able to set aside and revoke adoption orders as I've just mentioned. And this was a case In 2021 Lien Judgment handed down by Lord Justice Baker. And this was an application by mother who applied to revolt the adoption orders made in respect of her three Children. And this is where all three Children had been made subject to care and placement orders. Adoption application has been filed in respect to the youngest child and the other two Children and the birth parents applied for leave, proposed the making of adoption applications which were unsuccessful. Uh the adoption application was listed for hearing on six April 2020, which as you know, is literally just a few weeks after the first lockdown we had on 23 March 2020, mother was given notice of the hearing and as you know, on six April of court was that the country was subject to the first lockdown. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. My mother applied through her lawyer by email from the german to the final hearing to allow her to have more time to investigate the possibility of family placements. But the court refused this and in fact what the court did do is the court then did decide to go ahead with the hearing. But the adoption social worker sent a text message to mother informing her that due to the coronavirus outbreak, the hearing would take place remotely by telephone. But then just a short while there after the adoption social worker sent mother, another text message said that she had been informed that the judge was in fact excusing all parties from attending the hearing And there would be no telephone hearing as previously indicated that the hearing on six April, the court did in fact make the order the adoption order in private. And the court did say that there'd be no attendance at court by the adoption social birth parents due to the COVID-19 virus. The parents had been refused permission to oppose the adoption. Now they appealed. And the court had an email from the adoption social worker describing attempts made to engage with the birth parents. Children described as making a lot of progress in the adoption placement. But the mother did lodge an application vied inherent jurisdiction and she sought to revoke the care orders and the placement orders and indeed the adoption orders and she said that there had been unfairness and irregularity in so far as the procedure is concerned. The main argument was that they should have been a full hearing which should have taken place and therefore there was a breach of Article six of the European Convention. Now, looking at the law on this, what the court did say was mother was correct in that way and that mother was a party to adoption application. She was entitled to a hearing percentage of 4.5, of the FPR. She was enticed to attend the hearing and as her application will lead to oppose had been refused. She was entitled to be heard on the question of whether the adoption order should be made or not. So actually she was correct. She was entitled to a hearing and also the requirement to give noticed her mother was mandatory. We've got the listing final hearings in adoption cases, guidance to the mention in the first session where they're required to give notice is mandatory and they do have the right to attend some other did have the right to attend here not regard. So she was correct in that regard. But the question is, did this irregularity in terms of not giving mother the right to attend the hearing and not having the hearing. Did it amount to a fundamental breach of natural justice. And this is where the court said no and that's because mother did not have permission to oppose the adoption in that she had already had to leave to oppose. She had been unsuccessful and that the judge had decided to make the adoption order at that hearing. Mother would not have had the opportunity to effectively rerun the the the argument. So she wouldn't have had permission to oppose the making of the adoption order which was going to be handed down. She could therefore really do nothing to prevent the adoption from happening. Nonetheless, there was a breach of natural justice but given the impact of that, given that even if she was allowed to attend would have made any difference to the outcome and the answer would be no. And therefore the court did not allow that to be an argument in itself. Therefore to allow the adoption or to be set aside. His lordship did say that the better course of option for the mother would have been too far lots of appeal seeking permission to appeal within the time prescribed and was rather than applying under the inherent jurisdiction to revoke the adoption order and if an adoption order is to be set aside, the court did say that the applicant should bring the proceedings speed lee once any irregularity is known and here she should have done that as soon as possible. So you can see it's a really, really important case which really emphasizes the importance of of notice in that regard. Therefore, was the judge's decision to make the order was procedurally incorrect and which obviously must not be repeated. Again, it didn't meet the high hurdle of fundamental breach of natural justice to require the court Is that society adoption order. So you can see this case once again highlights the exceptional nature of being able to only exceptionally revolt adoption order and therefore how difficult it is to be able to do that in these circumstances. Okay, can I thank you very much indeed for listening. I hope that's been a useful session for you and indeed thank you very much indeed for coming to the end of this two part session. We have spent a fair bit of time going through with you. The role of adoption panels. The processes lead to revolt placement orders and lead to oppose the making of adoption orders. So can I thank you very much indeed. And I'll speak to you next time. Thank you very much. Bye for now.
Session One
Session One - Slides
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