Hello and welcome everybody very pleased to welcome you to today's session through Data law. Thank you very much indeed for joining me. So this then a session two of four where I'm taking you through some of the elements surrounding secure accommodation and deprivation of liberty in Children cases, some of the law to practice and also some current developments in this field. And as I mentioned in the first session, you'll appreciate that this is a very topical and very complex area of Children or at the moment there's a lot going on in this field and there's been a lot of high profile judgments in this area, particularly this year and therefore what you need to be familiar with going forward. So in The previous session, you remember I spent some time going through the position would secure accommodation. I looked at section 25 Children are looked at section 119 of the 2014 Act in Wales. We spent some time looking at some of the regulations, secure accommodation. Some of the case Law about the issue surrounding section 20 subsection three. When you got Children while 17, for example, I also looked at a position would ascend to our provisions. The purpose of secure and some of the practical steps insofar as that is concerned today. Then what I'm going to be doing is I'm going to be taking the issue further by looking at uh warship and really seeing how that then ties in with this area and they will be looking specifically at the use of secure accommodation, order and applications generally when it comes fire the use of the inherent jurisdiction. So we'll have a look at that going forward. Okay, So let me start with the position with warship. Now, this is where the case of reem comes into place. In case Of Reem 2016. This was a court of appeal decision uh leading judgment handed down by Lord Justice McFarland as he was then. And the issue in this case was this, what's the position with the course jurisdiction to make orders for warship and all to utilize the inherent jurisdiction for the accommodation of a child who has reached At the age of 17. So putting it another way can worship be used Once the child has turned 17 and is accommodated and the purpose behind this very much didn't look to see whether or not one could then look at maybe uh apply and then for secure accommodation order. And the court did say that the issue here was this. If you've got a child who's say in local authority foster care where note that the child has turned 17, it's not possible any longer, of course for the local authority. And to logic care application, any interim Care order would come to an end. Because of course, once a child reaches 17, it's no longer possible than to pursue interim care ward care order in those circumstances. But of course, if a care order was made beforehand and it continues until the charlie's 18. Unless it's discharged sooner. But because of Section 25 of the Children Act or Section 11 line of 2014. Act as I mentioned earlier, secure accommodation is available to Children who who are looked after by the local authority. And then you need to satisfy the criteria. The child's got a history of absconding and when they do it's kinda like to injure themselves or they're likely to endanger themselves or the child is beyond parental control. But you need to start with the provider that the child is looked after and looked after child and would be one who subject to an interim care order or care order Or accommodated in England via section 20 And in Wales under Section 76 of the Social Services and Well being Wales Act of 20 14. But if you've got a child who's 17 years of age, we could no longer there for golf or care An interim care orders. And the only way for that child to be accommodated. Fire. Section 20 of The Children Act in England or section 76 Of the 2014. Active. So the question was, can worship be used was a child turns 17 and is accommodated. And his lordship did say that the answer seems to be yes, but his lordship did say that the warship if you do utilize that, it can only be used to provide you with a framework to facilitate communication accountability between a local authority and the parents as opposed to placement governed in the same way we work for the purposes of section section 20 in England or section 76 in Wales. So yes, you can use warship but it's only whereby if the child's turned 17, it's where the child is already accommodated under consents are there and you're using warship to almost use it as a way of facilitating and accommodating that arrangements. It's not to actually enable the accommodation that's already happened. It's more to facilitate that process. Okay, So if we can't use the warship provisions in this regard to then accommodate a child who has turned 17. If the child and all the parents are not consenting to the voluntary accommodation, likely they're objecting to a child being accommodated in those circumstances. It's more as a way of providing a mechanism to enable that to take place. So it's important to bear that in mind. Now, as I mentioned earlier in the last session, I did say that when it comes to deprivation of liberty applications, we need to make sure that we understand the difference between the deprivation of liberty for which authorization is required and restriction of liberty for which it is not and restriction of liberty. As we said, the examples could be in domestic situation whereby the child is living at home with parents and of course, as you would ordinarily have, it is going to put a certain degree of control. So of course the younger the child is the more restriction to liberty. Bye Exerted by the parent as opposed to as the child gets older. And on the facts of this case. The case of the R. D. Deprivation or restriction of liberties. 2018 decision. The question here was this particular child who was 14 years of age who was subject to keep sitting subject to an interim care order and she was placed uh in a particular unit in Scotland. She had a complex set of therapeutic needs and her parents except they couldn't couldn't meet her needs. The question was whether in your circumstances, this particular unit that she was placed In by the local authority at a residential placements in Scotland was one where it was regarded as a deprivation of liberty. And if so then that would necessitate authorization by the court by way of a doll application and displacement was meeting her needs successfully. So the issue was that if the placement did take the form of effectively deprived of the liberty and of course the authorization would need to be sought because this would then be engaging Article five of the european convention whereby a person is then uh prohibited from having restrictions placed on them unless it's authorized by uh uh the state or by parliament otherwise. So if for example, they have convicted or cautioned or arrested for an offense which allows them to maybe be restrained or if it's for the purpose of their educational provision for example, and under facts. His lordship did say that this wasn't a case where a child did come within the regime of being deprived of their liberty. In terms of that regard, it was finally balanced. But the court said that it was not on the facts uh that case and the court did say it had been necessary for the court to examine whether these features did amount to a regime of complete supervision and control compared with the notional circumstances. A typical child of the same age station, familiar background, a relative maturity who is free from disability. And the court said they weren't persuaded that the staff ratio for the child in the unit indicates that the residents were subject to complete or constant supervision and controlling the circumstances. There were some features which may dictate that for example, the child could use the uh the internet for example, but it would have to go to the reception and use it. There has search histories on the uh kind of ipad and so forth, would be checked and so forth. But the court wasn't persuaded that the level of restriction as to what she could do was sufficient to say that it satisfied the acid test in terms of complete supervision and control. And therefore with that in mind, it did not therefore necessitate authorization in the form of a deprivation of liberty order. So as you can imagine, each case very much has to be looked at on its own facts to see whether it does meet the direct quiz it criterion so far as that is concerned. Now, that then brings me on to some of the more more recent developments. So we've got this case we? MA Child Secure Accommodation is 2018 decision. And one of the things that this case highlights is that secure accommodation order of its permit If it's granted, Of course, it does permit the local authority to keep a child in secure accommodation, but it doesn't compel them. So, as I as you remember earlier, when I mentioned this, I did say that if either of the limbs are met for the purposes of a of a secure accommodation would have been granted. And you remember, uh it doesn't say that the court shall make the Order. So section 25 subsection one other criteria, as you know, in England, and it does then provide that five of these limbs are met, then the court shall make the order. So you've got the provisions of this, section 25 subsection four, which says that, but it doesn't compel the local authorities took place in secure accommodation. It gives them the authorization to do so. It's more of a permissive order in that regard. And we m also really tackled the issue that was raised in that re w case at 2016 case that I mentioned about what we actually mean by absconding because, as you can imagine that case www really was looking at that in some detail and hear his lordship did say the absconding means nothing more than uh certainly the ordinary meaning in that regard. So it means something more than trivial, disobedient absence. And judges can be relied upon. His lordship said to give this word its ordinary meaning and recognize that it could be absconding and individual circumstances of the case. So on the facts here, this was a child who was 15.5 years of age. Care and supervision Orders had been made for some six months and her ground of appeal was she said that The judge was wrong to make her subject to the secure order for the period that the judge made. It was a six month order. She said that there was too much weight given and placed on historical events in the circumstances and the approach that the judge took, she argued was one where the order should not have been made for that long. It should have been a lot less, maybe two months, three months in the circumstances. But in fact on appeal, the court took the view that this judge knew the case or had worked through this case. There had been that level of judicial continuity and in fact, the judge was more than and tied toward and appraised in the circumstances to be able to make disorder in the circumstances and it was within the judges or jurisdiction to be able to do so, and therefore the order would on the facts stand Now, there's been other judicial developments since then. One of the difficult cases, uh legally, in terms of where one can pursue this is this case of a city council against Ellis and others secure Accommodation in our jurisdiction. This was a 2019 decision. And one of the issues that was raised in this case was weather the High Court through the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can in fact be used to authorize a local authority place insecure accommodation. A 17 year old who was not looked after by the local authority within the meaning of section 22 of the Children Act, but where the parents objected to that course of action and where the child was at grave risk of serious and possibly fatal harm. Okay, now, it's lordships was of the view that this wasn't possible. So let Me just break this down because as you can see, this is quite complex when we think about it. So, we're thinking of a situation where we've got 17 year old. Now, remember when a 17 year old, if the child isn't subject to a nice your care order, there's no ongoing proceedings where the final care order has been made, it's no longer possible to pursue that. So that's no longer possible. So the child cannot be accommodated via the care route in that regard. So the only other way is Uh section 20 in England or section 70 six in the 2014 Acting Wales for purpose who looked after the status with a view to them pursuing the care pursuing the secure accommodation order. So what do you do in that situation where If the child is 17 and they're not subject to a cable to the i. c. e. O. Then you're looking at a position with accommodation. As I mentioned that case of www. Talks about the fact that in that case one can utilize section 20 subsection three. But remember that's where the local authorities are saying that we are going to be accommodating to in fact we are obliged to accommodate because it says we shall accommodate a child where by not doing so discharge welfare will be seriously prejudiced. And on the facts of this case, this child was 17, he was involved in a gang activity which involved county lines, drug dealing, alleged involvement in knife crime and shooting with the risks of reprisals and the risk of possession of all access to firearms. So you can see a number of key concerns were being raised there. So the local authority lodged this application of form c. which is what they'll be doing if they are seeking to invoke the inherent jurisdiction on the high court. So they did that and they sought for this child to be placed uh in in an appropriate unit via that route. But the local authority did say they accepted that. The problem they had here was that the child was not looked after. Now, this is where, like I said, a child wasn't subject to care for. The child wasn't subject to an interim care order that couldn't go for kevin sings anymore. Given the age of the child, could they use section 20 subsection three where they shall accommodate where? By not doing so, the child's welfare would be seriously prejudice. Well, on the facts. Of course it would appear they could. But the problem the local authority had here Is the parents are objecting the mother was objecting. So of course she could use a section 20 subsection 8 to object To the placement. So even though the child couldn't use section 20 subsection 11, The mother could. And that's where therefore they could not accommodate a child through that route, either to the section 20 Route or Section 76, respectively, in Wales. And that's where the locals thought. He then turned to whether they could involve inherent jurisdiction of the High Court route. By Utilizing Section 100 of the Children act to see whether the local authority would be permitted to accommodate the child with a view to the open doorway to pursue a secure order that way. But in fact, his lordship said this, his lordship said. But the inherent jurisdiction is such that it the section prohibits the cord from exercising their jurisdiction to require a child to be placed in the care or part or to put under supervision of local authority or to require a child to be accommodated by on behalf of local authority. So that prohibits it. And the local authority did say we're not invited to court to require us to accommodate, was simply asking the court to authorize us to accommodate. But the court did say, look, there's no difference in that. They read it very much as the same. And therefore in fact, his lordship did say that he was satisfied that the court cannot use its inherent jurisdiction to authorized or require uh look, the child's placement and secure accommodation in a manor requested by the local authorities simply was not possible to be able to do this. Remember I mentioned uh the the the other case uh of VM earlier, which basically did say that these orders remember secure accommodation orders do not compel the local authority to accommodate, but they give you that permissive light to be able to do so. So On the facts of this case, what his lordship therefore, ultimately decided is if he got 17 year old, who is not subject to an ice your care order. Uh you can't utilize section 20 subsection three because you got parent with pr whose objects who is objecting. You can't utilize inherent jurisdiction to accommodate them either. In which case, that child cannot be regarded as looked after. Which means you cannot then open the doorway to pursue to secure accommodation order through the civil route. So that's the difficulty that this case highlighted. And therefore you can see the complex dilemmas that courts are therefore having to currently face in dealing with applications such as this one. Now, the other thing I wanted to raise is the position with this judicial review. This was a review a couple of years ago And this was this is the jr on the Queen and X. NBC 2019 decision. And this was an application by judicial review whereby what the court effectively decided was that if the child is being made subject to secure order and say there was then a review where the child no longer meets the criteria done, where does the local authorities stand? There must must stay then in those circumstances, then abide By that recommendation. And in fact, her ladyship did say, Impervious 19 20 of dis judgment that the secure regulations that Children secure congregation Regulations in 1991 are silent has the effect of decision by the review panel. That the criteria for keeping a child and secure no longer satisfied. But her ladyship did say that it could be inferred from the Regulation for regulation's 16 subsection three, that the ultimate decision is actually for a local authority and that the view of the panel is a recommendation only. So even though the review panel that I mentioned earlier in England, it's got to be Within a month after child being placed in Wales within 15 days. If they come up with that recommendation to say that they after view that the child no longer meets the criteria. This judgment is saying that ultimately the decision risks with the local authorities, so the local authority will obviously need to take into account the recommendation and ultimately they would then decide as to whether the criteria are met or not on that basis. So on the facts at the court did say that the application for J. R. Would be rejected on that basis. Now, that then brings me onto this case of said County council and M. F. And C. And this is a case which really looked at the issue surrounding the use of the inherent jurisdiction and deprivation of Liberty Liberty Cases. And this is one whereby the local authority sought to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. Okay, so this was a case involving One whereby yet the child who was 14 years of age and the local authority was seeking declarations at the care regime in place for a child which involved a declaration of liberty was in fact lawful. Now the child was subject to interim care order. And currently in proceedings. Now, as you can see here, this child is therefore looked after child and hence it is possible to go down the route of secure accommodation if appropriate. Uh and of course what one could then look at the position with deprivation with that in mind. Now the issue here was this this child was living in a registered a registered residential Children's home. So it was a Children's home that was registered with office dead and had been there for some time. And the Guardian in particular had raised issue as to whether this child's placement was in fact a declaration of liberty for which one would then require authorization. Now, all parties other than the mother supported for the local authority to obtain declarations pursuit in her jurisdiction. Uh route that daycare in this carefully child displacement was in fact lawful. Uh and the child was making good progress in this particular emplacement. But the mother opposed her view is this. The mother said that the child had been Insecure accommodation for some time and that displacement can only be sanctioned by section 25 Children Act Order, not by utilizing the inherent jurisdiction. So it's not that the mother was opposed to the regime in the placement. She said, yes. You know, she did accept that her child's needs were being appropriate. Matt in this unit. Mother's argument was more on a technicality where she was really questioning as to whether in light of the previous judgment in the case of re d Uh which was the 2019 decision. The Supreme Court decision whether it was an option to the court to sanction the deprivation of liberty under the inherent jurisdiction in these circumstances. And she said that the child had been placed in secure accommodation at that unit for some time. And the sanctions, there could only be the limitations, there could only be sanctioned in the corners of statutory regime which is by way of an application for secure accommodation. You couldn't use the inherent jurisdiction to be able to sanction this. Mhm. And this is where she therefore argued that it was simply not legally permissible to actually sanction on that basis. Now, first and foremost was this was the regime of deprivation in the first instance. Because as you know that case we are did that I mentioned earlier, one has to look to see whether or not this child is subjected to continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave the acid test. It needs to be met. Well on the fact that this child was a child who was supervised and supported at all times. It was on a on A 2-1 basis, uh Child was able to spend time in a bedroom alone. But there was a level of checking at regular times. She was transporting to her education provision, 1 to 1 support. She had to do a tutor, uh contact with her daughter with her father took place. It was supervised units to the unit, sorry, the door still unit were actually unlocked during the day but locked at night. Windows were not locked, but it didn't open it beyond a certain point. There was no secure perimeter. Child had never tried to leave the home. If she was, she would be followed by staff. And if staff last site where she would be reported as missing and then they would need assistance to retrieve her and she would not have access to a mobile phone, unsupervised access. Now all parties did agree as did the court that the acid test was met. There was sufficient restrictions here to suggest that there was that level of lack of freedom to leave the unit. Because if she was do you leave the unit, she would then be followed and brought back to unit. And there was that level of continuous supervision and control on that and of course of course there was all sort of restrictions on her access to a telephone and internet in terms of freedoms enjoyed by really many young people of her age. So it was the case that the parties felt that the acid test for deprivation in accordance with the case of P and Cheshire, Western Cheshire Council, another 2014 decision i. E. Is there uh continuous supervision and control? Was it a case where she was not free to leave was that met? And it was felt that criteria were met. Now this was a child who was of course looked after. So uh this was a case where she was looked after for whom the local authorities shared parental responsibility. She was subject to uh an interim care order in the circumstances. And one of the questions, therefore, the court really had to ask themselves is when can the inherent jurisdiction be involved in these circumstances? Well, Section 100 subsection three, other Children act as you know, does say that no application for exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction can be made unless they have obtained leave. Of course, of course, leave is acquired and when it comes to then seeking leave, the local authority would need to satisfy the court. That Section 100 subsection four are to be met, which provides that the uh leave will be granted if the court is satisfied that the result which local authorities wishes to achieve cannot be achieved through the making of any order which to which subsection five applies. And there is a reason, of course are believed, of course, inherent jurisdiction is not utilized in these circumstances, Then the child is likely to suffer significant harm. So, as you can see, that was that was therefore set in that the basis upon needing to satisfy the criterion. A section of 100. Now, this particular unit was not an approved secure Children's home. So it wasn't a secure accommodation which was approved as as such, a mother's argument was that the only law for route to deprive this child uh of her Child in these circumstances was via the section 25 Children, I would highly to pursue and obtain a secure accommodation order. And if the criteria were met. And of course that's one thing. But if the criteria are not met then there was no lawful basis upon which the Charles liberty could be restricted on this basis. As I said, this unit was not approved as a Children's home in accordance with regulation three of the secure accommodation regulations. And mother therefore like say, was arguing that the only lawful route to deprive this child in this Situation was via the section 25 route. Now mother's argument therefore was that she said the local authority needed to therefore seek approval for the unit to become a regulated unit. And the court did say that if mother's argument was correct and it would mean that if the child uh it would mean that as a child met the criteria in the section 25. So for secure to be made, then there would be no lawful way in which the current deprivation at the unit could be maintained. Uh That's as if that's if that's the case. But under a secure accommodation ordered a local authority would have no choice but to remove the child from her current placement because it wasn't an approved secure Children's home in those circumstances. And like so that's where mother was arguing for his local authorities and to seek approval for the unit to become a regulated unit. Now why was section 25 inappropriate in the circumstances, why is it this Child did not meet at the criteria? And this is where the court did say that section 25 should be very narrowly interpreted. So to apply, only saw his Children placed in accommodation, which is designed and has the purpose of restricting liberty Beyond Section 25. Children may be lawfully accommodated in residential Children's homes, but subject to various restrictions, which may constitute a deprivation of their liberty. So the question really was, could the inherent jurisdiction be used in these circumstances? And the court took the view that yes, it can. Section 100. Subsection four does say that the court may only grant leave where the result, that when he's trying to achieve cannot be obtained through any other means. And if the child's welfare requires it. And the court here did say that it could be utilized uh in those circumstances, in so far as the inherent jurisdiction. But here on the facts, The court did say that the section 25 order was inappropriate in the circumstances. one, because the unit does not constitute a secure accommodation Unit for the personal section 25, it wasn't an approved secure unit. And secondly, the court was satisfied. And that the child's particular circumstances Did not satisfy the section 25 criteria. The child didn't constitute a risk of injury to herself and others and to place her in such a unit would be unnecessary and disproportionate in these circumstances. So you can see it's quite an interesting argument that was being run by mother, but you can see the court on the facts did not feel that the child met the criteria and therefore there was no need for the local authority to even go down the route of seeking approval for the unit to become a regulated secure unit in that regard. And in fact in how a jurisdiction can be used in limited cases. Now that then brings me on to the case of re be This 2018 decision about the criteria for secure accommodation orders. And this really emphasizes the fact that when as in this case you got a child, This child was 15 years of age accommodated in the Children's home. The concerns related to allegations of sexual abuse and physical abuse and the child was accommodated in this unit and the local authority later than sought a secure accommodation order. Uh One of the concerns in this case, like so many of these cases, there was sadly no secure accommodation unit available. So that's where the local authorities and placed a child in an alternative placement. So local authorities couldn't find the proof secure accommodation unit. They approach a local agency about an alternative placement and which was highly specialized in providing shared accommodation placements for Children in these circumstances. But this was not registered with Office Dead and no approved by the Secretary of State for use as a secure accommodation. So it was a unit which wasn't registered with officers. So it wasn't a Children's home that was registered and it wasn't approved as a as a secure accommodation unit either. So to have the child placed in that unit. The local authority quite rightly then applied for a deprivation of Liberty order vied inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the agency at the unit that informed local authorities that day, uh would of course be in a position to do what they can in the circumstances. But they said we will be able to support the child here until we can find appropriate placement thereafter. And later the local authorities did in fact find a secure accommodation is uh which had now become available. So the question media was, could the child remain at this unit or should they now be moving to the secure accommodation unit? And the court did say that in cases such as this, what do we actually mean by secure accommodation? Well, secure accommodation is simply nothing more than a unit which is used for the purposes of restricting liberty. That's what the court said. Uh The secure accommodation unit is is the child's welfare relevant in a secure application. Now, you remember right from the outset On Session one, I did refer to the case of reem, which was the old decision which basically said that technically the welfare check list. And the section 13. And one no, no other principle, Section 15 is inapplicable. Having said that this more recent case, the court in fact has taken the view that uh in these circumstances the local authority under court must consider what this placement would safeguard and promote the child's welfare. So welfare is not paramount, but it is an important element in the court's analysis. So therefore we have to take into Canada that is actually part of development criteria, so you can't ignore that. Of course, it is highly relevant in those circumstances. What I wanted to then finish with today, uh in terms of looking at these elements is the lack of secure accommodation yet. So, as you can imagine, what we've got then is a situation which has been a major issue something over the last few years in particular, which is Children who clearly meet the criteria for secure are not being placed in secure accommodation units or those people who may meet the criteria for secure, but it felt that the security may not meet their specific needs. And that's where the local authorities are now looking at alternative placements in the form of placements elsewhere. And then to seek for authorizations for that vile inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. And that's where a number of these cases, such as re s Children care and register placement identifies the difficulty that local authorities career having in so far as placing Children in such units. And this is one example of that. This was a case by Mr. Justice Cobb. And this case involved a 15 year old whereby she was subject to an interim care order and she was residing in a in a cottage for purposes of of accommodation. So this was a placement provided for by the local authorities. So uh the aim was to to have the child placed there. And this placement was supervised placement was unregistered and was unregulated by offset because it came under a unregulated placement as opposed to unregistered in that regard. And his lordship did say that this really illustrates the number of cases a crossing the whales whereby Children have been placed in his unregulated placements due to a shortage of secure accommodation units. This child was on the fact subject to deprivation of liberty and therefore her placement needs to be authorized by the court and that's where the local authorities and sought to involve the inherent jurisdiction of the court High Court. To enable that to be done. This was a child by where background had previously taken an overdose of prescribed drugs. Parents felt unable to be able to meet this child's needs going forward. She had a history of absconding. They couldn't cope with her behavior. She continued to abscond from her placements, She had sadly self harmed and she had to undergo surgery to remove strands of items that she had swallowed. For example, local authority had lodge cape ceilings. They did acquire a secure accommodation unit. But sadly she absconded from that unit, she was putting herself at risk and that's where the local authorities and placed a larger than the secure accommodation application is already. The deprivation of liberty application for the child to then be placed in a unit which was unregulated in these circumstances. Now this is where his lordship specifically referred to the guidance which became available by the President of Family Division officer. Now, this guidance is the practice guidance. The full title is practice guidance placements in unregistered Children's homes in England or unregistered Que home servicing why was jointly prepared by the President of Family Division and Office did as 12 November 2019. And this guidance makes it very clear that judges must ensure that when they are looking at being asked to authorize a placement in an unregistered unit, that steps immediately taken by those operating unit to apply for registration. If of course the unit requires registration. So that that placement that can then become regulated within the statutory scheme as soon as possible. And here his lordship did say that the conditions, the plates placement on the facts of this particular case did a man to deprivation of Liberty for the Purpose of Article five of the European convention, the child's circumstances did fit within the stork in Germany decision of 2006 in that uh you did have the objective element of liberty for the purposes of Article five in that there was a confinement for not negligible period of time. Uh There was the absence of consent. That confinement. And thirdly confinement was indisputable to the States. So those three factors as in order stock in Germany case set out. And it's only when those three factors are There, which they were is their deprivation of liberty which then engages article five of the European Convention and therefore, which requires the authorization which the local authority would seek. Now, one of the other things in granted disorder. One of the other things that his lordship did pick up on is the position surrounding transporting. And this is where if you look at paragraph 24, the judgment, it's really important because his lordship did say that there's one thing about getting this placement and having a child uh in that unit where they are deprived of their liberty, but it's authorized. But it's another thing getting them there. So therefore when you are seeking the order, the Dark Lord, it's very important to make sure that if the court soul feels that it's in their best interest to do so that the order also caters for the fact that it covers transporting that child to and from the placement to court. For example, another meetings to contact another necessary journeys. So it's very important to make sure that let's ask for and therefore what what I would suggest is in the order you need to be inserting in there something along the lines at the local authorities, officers and agents are authorized to use reasonable force to detain the child in a transport or to return her to that transport in the event that she attempts to leave. So, you may need something along those lines to cover that. One of the other things that his lordship did say that he was really been asked whether this is more of an acute problem now than we've had previously because of the Covid pandemic. But in fact, his lordship quite rightly would suggest. So actually, that this has been a problem. We were before the onset of Covid, there's been a severe shortage of secure beds prior to this and therefore this has been a chronic problem even before then. But of course, Covid has exasperated the situation. So, in terms of the way forward, his lordship did say that he wished to raise awareness of the major problems with not having sufficient units secure accommodation units are not alternative units available and therefore, copies of adapted copies of these documents would under court papers would be provided to the Secretary of State for Education, the Chair of the Residential Care Leadership Board Minister for Health and also achieve social workers of those officials would then be notified given the crisis that we're in in terms of the difficulties for meeting Children's needs in this regard. Okay, so that brings this session to an end. So you can see we've covered a number of issues then, looking specifically at the position with how the law relating to deprivation of liberty has now developed what I'm going to be doing in the next couple of sessions. Who's taking you through two of the more recent cases surrounding this issue, particularly in relation to the stance insofar as unregistered and unregulated placements are concerned, and also the issues surrounding the Charles consent. Uh, and that's where we'll be looking at the case of VT in particular, and I thank you very much indeed for listening, and I'll speak to you soon. Thank you very much. Bye for now.
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